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This Week in Peace #119: March 13

By
Tara Abhasakun
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Kalemie, Tanganyika, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), photo by Alain Nkingi via Pexels.

This week, UN rights chief calls for South Sudan ceasefire, peacekeepers defy military order to shut down base. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) communications minister says EU should sanction Rwanda for war. Regional institutions meet to discuss cooperation for peace in West Africa.

UN Rights Chief Calls for South Sudan Ceasefire, Peacekeepers Defy Military Order to Shut Down Base

On March 10, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk called for a ceasefire amidst continued fighting in South Sudan. Türk said he was horrified by increasing reports of brutal killings of civilians, the destruction and poisoning of key water sources, and new waves of mass displacement. 

Türk said, “There must a ceasefire as promptly as possible, to save lives and turn this conflict in the direction of a negotiated solution.”

This development came after on March 9, UN peacekeepers defied a military order to shut down their base in Akobo. Located on the border with Ethiopia, the town is an opposition stronghold where tens of thousands of refugees have fled. 

The UN peacekeeping mission in Akobo said it would provide “a protective presence for civilians” in the town. The mission added that it was deeply engaging with national, state, and local stakeholders regarding the order. 

South Sudan’s peace agreement is in grave danger. On February 27, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned “We are at a dangerous point, when rising violence is combined with deepening uncertainty over South Sudan’s political trajectory, as the peace agreement comes under severe strain.” 

South Sudan’s conflict is between the military, which is loyal to President Salva Kiir, and insurgents believed to be allied with the suspended vice-president Riek Machar. On March 1, at least 169 people were killed in violence in Abiemnom county near the Sudan border.

DRC Communications Minister Says EU Should Sanction Rwanda for War

A week after the United States sanctioned Rwanda’s army, accusing them of supporting the M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), DRC’s communications minister Patrick Muyaya told EU Observer on March 10 that EU foreign ministers should “support” the Trump administration by matching its sanctions against the Rwandan army. 

Despite evidence that Rwanda is supporting M23, Rwanda continues to deny this. Rwanda’s government released a statement condemning the US sanctions, calling them unjustified. 

Muyaya added that Trump “deserves much more support from the European Union” in order to pressure Rwanda.

Regional Institutions Meet to Discuss Cooperation for Peace in West Africa

A group representatives from regional institutions, including the the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), met this week to discuss strengthening cooperation for peace in West Africa. The meeting was organized by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

Representing KAIPTCH, Zibrim Ayorrogo stressed the need for stronger collaboration between ECOWAS and regional training centers. He said the meeting was a chance to review the memorandum of understanding between ECOWAS and the Centres of Excellence, and find ways to enhance their joint work. 

KAIPTCH’s Teresa Krafft reaffirmed Germany’s long-standing partnership with ECOWAS and the region’s training centres.

Meeting participants reflected on the progress achieved under the ECOWAS Peace, Security and Governance Project, and identified areas where more collaboration could help to tackle regional security threats.

Keywords: Peace, South Sudan, DRC, West Africa, ECOWAS, Africa, East Africa, conflict, conflict resolution

Peace in Manipur Cannot Be Built on the Silence of Its Smallest Communities

By
Haobijam Brijesh Singh
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Cheiraoba is a celebration in Manipur of the new year during the spring season. People feast (top), then climb up a hill together later in the day to signify overcoming hurdles and reaching new heights in the new year. Photo by Mongyamba via Wikipedia.

When violence erupted across India’s Manipur state in May 2023, the crisis quickly spiralled into one of the country’s most severe episodes of ethnic conflict in recent decades. Clashes between the Meitei and Kuki communities led to hundreds of deaths, the burning of villages, and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. News coverage and political debate have largely framed the violence as a confrontation between these two dominant ethnic blocs.

However, beyond these headlines, the binaries of Meitei versus Kuki or Naga versus Kuki ethnic groups obscure another reality that rarely receives attention. Across Manipur’s hills and borderlands live dozens of smaller communities whose villages often sit on the fault lines of competing territorial claims. Their political voice is limited, and when violence escalates between larger groups, they often become invisible casualties of conflicts they did not initiate (Singh & Garai, 2026). Their exclusion may be one of the least examined obstacles to sustainable peace in the state.

A Structurally Divided State

Manipurs’ political instability cannot be understood without acknowledging its layered ethnic composition. The population is broadly organised into three major groupings: the Meitei (including Meitei Bamons and Meitei Pangals) concentrated in the Imphal Valley, and multiple tribal communities inhabiting the surrounding hill districts, commonly aggregated under the labels “Naga” and “Kuki.”

Thirty-four communities are officially recognised as Scheduled Tribes under Article 342 of the Constitution of India (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2021), while the Meitei are classified as non-tribal (Meetei, 2016). More than 30 languages are spoken across the state, with Manipuri (Meiteilon) serving as the official language and Lingua franca (Devi & Singh, 2015). This diversity is often celebrated culturally; however, politically, it is structured through institutional asymmetry.

Although the hill districts constitute more than 90 percent of Manipur’s landmass, the Imphal Valley remains the administrative and economic centre. Valley populations enjoy stronger integration into state institutions and better access to infrastructure and education, whereas hill communities rely more heavily on customary governance systems (Kipgen, 2021). Developmental disparities persist, particularly in terms of healthcare, infrastructure, and employment.

These inequalities are not recent developments. The British colonial administration formalised separate governance arrangements for the hills and valleys, embedding differentiated political trajectories (Naorem, 2006). After statehood in 1972, Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) were established under Article 371C, but they remain widely regarded as fiscally and administratively weak (Kipgen, 2021). Land regulations further reinforce this division: non-tribals cannot purchase land in the hills, whereas tribals may acquire land across the state (Singh, 2014). 

Peace efforts that ignore these structural asymmetries risk addressing symptoms rather than causes. For instance, major peace initiatives in Manipur, such as negotiations with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim and the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki armed groups, have primarily focused on dominant ethnic actors, leaving smaller communities with little representation in formal dialogue processes.

Ethnonationalism and the Consolidation of Power

Ethnonationalism in Manipur serves both as an expression of identity and as a political instrument. Scholars such as Connor (1970) and Le Bossé (2021) argue that deep psychological attachment drives ethnonationalism to collective identity. In Manipur, colonial administrative separation fostered a bifurcated political consciousness (Naorem, 2006), which was later amplified by competing territorial imaginaries, such as Nagalim and Kukiland (Meetei, 2016).

Land became more than just territory; it became a sacred inheritance tied to survival. However, as Green (2006) and Yang (2000) note, ethnicity is a historically fluid and socially constructed concept. Treating ethnic blocs as fixed and homogenous erases internal diversity and reinforces rigid political binaries. Smaller tribes are often the first casualties of such rigidity.

The Hidden Hierarchies Within Ethnic Politics

Colonial-era umbrella categories, such as ‘Naga’ and ‘Kuki’, consolidated dozens of distinct tribes under broader labels (Oinam, 2003; Zehol, 1998). Postcolonial elites mobilised these identities to strengthen territorial claims. Communities, including the Anal, Moyon, Monsang, and Maring, were later integrated into the Naga fold despite earlier associations with Kuki conglomerations (Kipgen, 2011). Such shifts reveal the political nature of ethnic alignment.

However, for smaller tribes, inclusion within larger blocs can dilute cultural autonomy and political specificity (Singh & Garai, 2025). While dominant groups negotiate autonomy and territorial recognition, micro-minorities struggle to articulate developmental and security concerns. Peace negotiations that treat ethnic blocs as internally unified entities risk reproducing their hierarchy. For example, negotiations between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM), such as the ceasefire agreement of 1997 and the Naga Framework Agreement of 2015, have treated the Naga as a single political actor despite the presence of diverse tribes with uneven power dynamics.

Conflict and the Marginalisation of Micro-Minorities

Major episodes of violence, such as the Naga–Kuki clashes of the 1990s and the Meitei–Kuki violence of 2023, are typically framed as confrontations between dominant identities. However, many smaller communities occupy overlapping territories at the centre of competing claims (Akhup, 2012). During crises, their neutrality and strategic positioning are frequently questioned (Samson, 2015). National and regional media coverage in 2023 essentially presented the unrest through a Meitei–Kuki binary, further marginalising smaller voices (The Hindu Bureau, 2023).

This narrative exclusion mirrors institutional exclusion. Autonomous District Councils lack reserved mechanisms to ensure the representation of micro-minorities (Singh & Garai, 2025). Development schemes often treat “tribal” communities as a homogenous category, overlooking disparities in population size, political access, and administrative reach (Siamkhum, 2017). Meanwhile, the bifurcated land governance regime leaves smaller communities vulnerable to selective interpretations and displacement (Singh & Garai, 2026).

Although Scheduled Tribe status offers constitutional safeguards, India does not recognise a distinct category for smaller ethnic minorities, leaving micro-minorities exposed to broader majoritarian politics.

Beyond Ceasefires: Building Inclusive Peace

The crisis in Manipur is frequently addressed as a law-and-order issue. While security deployments and emergency relief provide immediate containment, they do not dismantle entrenched hierarchies. Sustainable peace requires structural inclusivity.

First, smaller tribes need guaranteed representation in Autonomous District Councils and advisory bodies.

Second, land governance reforms must ensure transparency, documentation, and inclusive dispute resolution.

Third, development planning must move beyond a homogenised ‘tribal’ category and adopt differentiated approaches that reflect demographic and institutional realities.

Civil society also plays a critical role. Conflict-sensitive journalism must move beyond reductive binary thinking. Dialogue platforms must include micro-minorities. Documentation and advocacy must amplify experiences that are currently unrecorded.

Peace Requires Justice at the Margins

Peace built solely on the balancing of dominant blocs will remain fragile. When smaller communities are excluded from representation, land security, and development planning, distrust deepens. When their identities are absorbed into larger political projects, diversity becomes a vulnerability rather than a strength.

Manipur’s repeated cycles of violence suggest that managing majoritarian rivalries is not enough. Lasting peace depends on dismantling the hierarchies embedded in governance. Justice for the smallest communities is not a secondary issue. It is the foundation of peace.

Keywords: India, Manipur, ethnic, tribal, minorities, peace, conflict, conflict resolution, colonialism, British, Indian constitution, communities, community, tribes

Everyday Insecurity: Why Peace Remains Illusive in Everyday Life in Bangsamoro, Philippines

By
Raihan A. Yusoph and Almahdi Alonto
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A screenshot of Lanao Del Sur from a video.

In the province of Lanao del Sur in the Philippines’ Bangsamoro region, peace is often discussed in official reports, agreements, and donor briefings. Yet for many residents, peace remains fragile, uncertain, and deeply contested. Although the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) formally ended decades of armed rebellion, it did not end the everyday fear of violence.. In many communities, the presence of firearms continues to shape daily life, limiting movement, straining relationships, and undermining trust.

This prompts an important question: Why does insecurity persist in Bangsamoro despite signed peace agreements and implemented disarmament and reintegration efforts?

Our research on the political economy of firearms in Lanao del Sur suggests that the answer lies not simply in the failure to collect firearms, but in how firearms are embedded in local systems of power, survival, and social relations. According to a survey of 600 participants across four municipalities in the province, firearms are not just instruments of violence—they are part of a broader political and economic order that sustains everyday insecurity.

When Peace Agreements Don’t Reach the Ground

The CAB is widely regarded as a milestone in the Bangsamoro peace process. It created new institutions, paved the way for autonomy, and began decommissioning former Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) combatants. Yet for many communities, these reforms have not led to meaningful improvements in local security. The reason is straightforward: disarmament has been partial. While the normalization process focuses on former rebels, it largely excludes civilian-held firearms, private armed groups, and politically connected militias. As a result, a significant share of the arms landscape remains untouched.

This gap reflects a broader problem in peacebuilding: the assumption that ending vertical armed conflict automatically leads to peace. In reality, local dynamics, particularly clan conflict (rido), weak institutions, and patronage politics, still drive demand for firearms. As our study shows, the cessation of war has not dismantled the structures that sustain violence. 

Power Dynamics

In Lanao del Sur, firearms are used not only for protection, but also to exert influence. During election periods, weapons are reportedly distributed to mobilize supporters, intimidate rivals, and secure political advantage. In this context, firearms serve as political capital. Even more troubling is the perception that firearms circulate among state and non-state actors. Community respondents frequently identified members of the security sector, armed groups, politicians, and informal dealers as key sources of firearms. This blurring of boundaries undermines the state’s legitimacy and complicates efforts to regulate firearms.

When the institutions responsible for security are perceived as part of the problem, public trust erodes. Citizens become less willing to rely on formal mechanisms of protection and justice, turning instead to self-help strategies, including the possession of firearms. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle: weak institutions encourage gun ownership, and widespread gun ownership further weakens institutions.

The Reality of Everyday Insecurity

Despite common assumptions that firearms provide protection, most residents of Lanao del Sur view them as a source of insecurity. Survey findings show that firearms are widely perceived to undermine peace, disrupt social relations, and threaten family safety. These effects are evident in everyday life. People avoid certain roads, impose self-imposed curfews, and refrain from speaking openly in public. Even minor disagreements can escalate into violence, creating a culture of caution and silence. This is what we call “everyday insecurity”: a condition in which fear becomes normalized and shapes routine behavior. In such environments, the mere possibility of violence is enough to constrain social and economic activity.

Firearms also distort justice. In communities where access to firearms determines power, disputes are often settled through intimidation rather than through the law. This weakens both formal legal institutions and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, making it harder to achieve fair and lasting outcomes. 

Why Disarmament Programs Often Fail: Rido and the Social Logic of Armed Retention

Conventional disarmament programs often overlook social realities in Lanao Del Sur. Understanding why firearms persist requires attention to local cultural dynamics, particularly rido. These clan-based conflicts are deeply rooted in systems of honor, obligation, and retaliation. In this context, owning a firearm is not only about security; it is also about maintaining dignity and preparedness. As long as rido remains unresolved, disarmament is perceived as risky. Surrendering a firearm can signal weakness, leaving individuals and families vulnerable to attack. This helps explain why many households retain firearms despite recognizing the broader harm they pose. By ignoring these realities and treating firearms as purely technical or legal issues, these programs neglect the cultural and relational dimensions of violence. 

The dominant disarmament model, often framed as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), is largely technocratic. It focuses on collecting weapons, reintegrating combatants, and strengthening state control. While these goals are important, they are insufficient. In Lanao del Sur and even larger Bangsamoro, firearms are sustained by a complex political economy involving elite interests, economic incentives, and social norms. Without addressing these underlying factors, disarmament efforts risk being superficial. For example, as long as political elites benefit from armed followers, there is little incentive to fully disarm. Similarly, when poverty and insecurity persist, firearms remain tools of protection and livelihood. In this sense, the problem is not simply the presence of guns, but the system that makes them necessary.

Rethinking Disarmament: From Control to Transformation

What would a more effective approach look like?

Community perspectives offer important insights. Rather than rejecting disarmament, many residents support it on different terms. They emphasize the need to address the root causes of violence, not just its symptoms. 

First, resolving rido is essential. Peacebuilding efforts must invest in culturally grounded mediation to restore relationships and address grievances. Without reconciliation, disarmament will remain fragile. 

Second, economic alternatives matter. Programs that provide livelihoods, skills training, and financial support can reduce reliance on firearms for protection or income. However, these initiatives must be carefully designed to prevent elite capture and ensure fairness and sustainability. 

Third, rebuilding trust in institutions is critical. This requires improving the accessibility, impartiality, and accountability of the justice system and law enforcement. Communities must see that the law protects everyone, not just the powerful.

Finally, disarmament must be inclusive. It should involve not only state actors but also traditional leaders, civil society, the women and youth sector, and former combatants. Peace cannot be imposed from above; it must be negotiated from the bottom up.

Peace Beyond the Absence of War

The experience of Lanao del Sur challenges conventional understandings of peacebuilding. It shows that ending armed rebellion is only the first step. Without addressing the political, economic, and cultural drivers of violence, insecurity can persist even in “post-conflict” settings. For policymakers and peacebuilders, the lesson is clear: disarmament is not only about reducing firearms. It is about transforming the systems that enable violence. Until then, peace in Bangsamoro will remain incomplete, visible in agreements and institutions, but elusive in the everyday lives of its people.

Keywords: Philippines, Bangsamoro, guns, firearms, conflict, peace, conflict resolution, disarmament, DDR

This Week in Peace #118: March 6

By
Tara Abhasakun
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Siem Reap province, Cambodia. Photo by Humphrey Muleba via Pexels.

This week, US sanctions Rwandan forces over DRC peace deal violations. South Sudan peace agreement in grave danger. Cambodian official encourages peace with Thailand. 

US Sanctions Rwandan Forces Over DRC Peace Deal Violations

The United States sanctioned Rwanda’s army and four top commanders, accusing them of supporting the M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The US Department of the Treasury said on March 2 that the rebels’ successes would not have been possible without Rwandan support.

Fighting in the region has continued despite the Trump-brokered peace deal between the governments of DRC and Rwanda in December. The US Department of the Treasury alleged that Rwanda’s army was undermining the peace deal by training, equipping and fighting with M23.

Despite evidence that Rwanda is supporting M23, Rwanda continues to deny this. Rwanda’s government released a statement condemning the US sanctions, saying, “The sanctions issued today by the United States unjustly targeting only one party to the peace process misrepresent the reality and distort the facts of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.”

South Sudan’s Peace Agreement In Grave Danger

South Sudan’s peace agreement is in grave danger. On February 27, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned “We are at a dangerous point, when rising violence is combined with deepening uncertainty over South Sudan’s political trajectory, as the peace agreement comes under severe strain.” 

South Sudan’s conflict is between the military, which is loyal to President Salva Kiir, and insurgents believed to be allied with the suspended vice-president Riek Machar. On March 1, at least 169 people were killed in violence in Abiemnom county near the Sudan border.

The High Commissioner’s office, OHCHR, documented that 189 civilians were killed in January, with several others wounded, marking a 45 percent increase in violence and abuses over the previous month. 

Türk noted that senior military officials had used hate speech to incite violence targeting entire communities and ethnicities. Meanwhile, the UN said that access to aid remains fragile, and 109,000 people live surrounded by floodwaters and are “increasingly exposed” to the impacts of climate change. .

Cambodian Official Encourages Peace With Thailand

On March 3 at Cambodia’s National Culture Day celebration, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Civil Service Hun Many spoke out encouraging peace with Thailand.

Many said that although Cambodia was committed to protecting its territory, the military did not have an advantage over Thailand, and diplomacy rather than violence was the right solution. Many added that steps toward peace could include cooperating with national and international organizations such as UNESCO.

On July 28, 2025, Thailand and Cambodia reached a ceasefire after days of escalation in conflict beginning on July 24. The escalation began a day after a landmine explosion injured five Thai soldiers, including one who lost his leg. However, the series of events that led to the escalation were disputed between the two countries, with both sides blaming the other. The ongoing conflict is over disputed land surrounding a temple in Cambodia.

Despite the July 28 ceasefire, tensions remain high between the two countries. The World Health Organization reported in December 2025 that there have been 18 civilian deaths in Cambodia, including an infant and an elderly person, with 79 injured. Meanwhile, in Thailand, a total of 16 civilian deaths have been reported, including one directly related to fighting, and six civilians have been injured.

Keywords: DRC, Congo, Rwanda, M23, South Sudan, Cambodia, Thailand, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

Beyond Western Peacebuilding Frameworks: Assessing Ubuntu’s Effectiveness in African Conflict Resolution

By
Castor Mfugale
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A Gacaca trial in Rwanda, photo by Scott Chacon via Wikipedia. Gacaca courts combined accountability with local participation.

In November 2022, the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formalized the Pretoria Peace Agreement, effectively concluding a protracted and devastating two-year civil war—an infrequent yet significant instance of diplomatic resolution within the African context. This case exemplifies a recurrent pattern across post-conflict African societies, wherein formal peace accords are enacted, state institutions reconstructed, and judicial mechanisms established; nonetheless, enduring legacies of mistrust, societal fragmentation, and intergroup resentment frequently outlast the cessation of hostilities.

Why is peace sometimes complete on paper, but fragile in everyday life?

One reason this issue persists lies in the type of peace frameworks that are often applied. Many peacebuilding models used in Africa are rooted in Western traditions that emphasize individual rights, legal procedures, and institutional reforms. These approaches have value, but they often struggle to address the deeper moral and relational damage caused by conflict. In societies where identity, responsibility, and dignity are deeply communal, peace cannot be sustained by rules and courts alone. This is where Ubuntu, an African ethical tradition centered on shared humanity and interdependence, offers a compelling alternative.

When peace becomes procedural

Western-inspired peacebuilding frameworks tend to view peace as a technical problem: rebuilding institutions, enforcing laws, and ensuring accountability. Justice is often understood in legal terms—who violated which rule, and what punishment should follow.

For many African communities, however, violence is not experienced only as a legal violation. It is a rupture in relationships—between neighbors, families, clans, and generations. When conflict tears apart the moral fabric of a community, restoring order without restoring relationships can leave peace shallow and unstable. This helps explain why in places such as Rwanda, South Sudan, and Liberia, elections and peace accords built institutions, but unresolved grievances and mistrust endured, showing that peace structures without repaired moral bonds remain fragile.

Ubuntu: peace as a shared moral achievement

Ubuntu is often summarized by the phrase “I am because we are.” At its core, it holds that a person becomes fully human through relationships with others. Dignity is not only an individual attribute; it is something affirmed and sustained by the community. From this perspective, wrongdoing harms not just a victim and a perpetrator, but the entire social body. Justice, therefore, is not only about punishment. It is about restoring relationships, rebuilding trust, and reintegrating those who have caused harm back into the moral community—without denying accountability.

Peace, in an Ubuntu framework, is not merely the absence of violence. It is the presence of restored relationships. 

What does Ubuntu look like in practice?

Ubuntu is not an abstract philosophy. Its principles have shaped real peacebuilding processes across Africa. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 1995 and active mainly from 1996 to 1998, prioritized truth-telling and public acknowledgment of harm over widespread retributive punishment. Victims were given a voice, perpetrators were required to confront the human impact of their actions, and society was invited to rebuild itself through moral recognition rather than collective denial. The process was imperfect, but it helped prevent a cycle of revenge and created space for coexistence after apartheid.

In northern Uganda, communities recovering from decades of conflict have relied on traditional reconciliation rituals such as Mato Oput, which emphasize confession, symbolic restitution, and communal healing. Justice here is not about isolating the offender, but about repairing the broken social bond so that community life can continue.

From 1999 through the early 2000s, Rwanda’s community-based Gacaca courts combined accountability with local participation in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, reflecting an attempt to rebuild social trust at the grassroots level, where neighbors had to learn to live together again after unimaginable violence

What unites these examples is a shared understanding: Peace cannot be imposed from above. It must be rebuilt from within communities, ordinary people at the center of peace. One of Ubuntu’s greatest strengths is that it places ordinary people—not just political elites or international experts—at the center of peacebuilding. Elders, women’s groups, youth, and local mediators are recognized as moral agents with legitimate authority. Ubuntu-informed peacebuilding enables more effective peace processes in Africa by grounding peacemaking in human dignity, relational context, and non-polarizing narratives that reorient people away from conflict escalation toward reconciliation and social repair. 

Challenges and limits

Ubuntu is not a magic solution. Romanticizing tradition can obscure power inequalities, silence marginalized voices, or excuse abuses. Some customary practices may conflict with universal human rights standards, particularly regarding gender or minority protections. There is also the challenge of scale. Relational, community-based approaches can be difficult to integrate into modern state institutions built around bureaucracy and legal uniformity. These tensions are real—but they are not reasons to dismiss Ubuntu. Instead, they point to the need for hybrid peace frameworks that combine relational ethics with formal institutions. Courts, laws, and rights remain essential, but they become more effective when embedded within moral practices of dialogue, recognition, and reconciliation. 

Rethinking what success looks like

Ubuntu invites us to rethink how we measure peace. Instead of focusing only on elections held or laws passed, it asks deeper questions: Are relationships being repaired? Is trust being rebuilt? Do people feel recognized as members of a shared moral community? In many African contexts, these questions matter as much as constitutional reforms or legal verdicts.

Peace as a lived practice

Peace is not a destination reached once institutions are in place. It is an ongoing ethical practice, sustained through everyday acts of recognition, responsibility, and care.

By grounding peace in shared humanity rather than abstract procedures alone, Ubuntu offers a powerful lens for building peace that lasts. It does not reject global norms, but reinterprets them through relational values that resonate with lived experience.

Keywords: Africa, African, Ubuntu, conflict, conflict resolution, peace, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa, Rwanda, peacebuilding, Western, framework

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