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Nine Years After Marawi: Can Reconstruction Truly Heal a Wounded City in the Philippines?

By
Raihan A. Yusoph
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The Sarimanok Sport Stadium in MAA. Photo captured by Raihan Yusoph, May 15, 2026.

Nine years after the Marawi Siege, the Philippine government continues to present rehabilitation as a success story measured by highways, public buildings, sports complexes, and ceremonial inaugurations. Yet beneath the polished language of “recovery” lies a more troubling reality. Thousands of displaced Mranaw (People of Lanao) families still struggle to reclaim stable lives, while the state’s post-conflict framework remains deeply centered on visible infrastructure rather than human rehabilitation. Marawi today stands as a city rebuilt in appearance but still fractured in substance. Concrete has risen from the ruins of war, but justice, dignified return, and social recovery remain painfully incomplete.

The siege that erupted on 23 May 2017 between government forces and the Maute Group transformed Marawi into the site of the deadliest urban conflict in recent Philippine history. What began as a security operation escalated into a five-month war that devastated the Islamic city, displaced entire communities, and left deep psychological scars on the people of Lanao. Government records estimated that about 77,170 families, or more than 353,921 people, were displaced by the conflict, while official casualty reports documented the deaths of government troops, civilians, and militants. Entire neighborhoods within the Most Affected Area (MAA) were reduced to rubble, forcing residents to evacuate to temporary shelters and settlements throughout Lanao del Sur and neighboring provinces. In response, the Duterte administration established the Inter-Agency Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) through Administrative Order No. 3, assigning it responsibility for rebuilding the city and normalizing civilian life.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction through Infrastructure

Over the years, reconstruction has become closely associated with large-scale infrastructure projects intended to symbolize recovery and modernization. Road networks were rebuilt across the MAA, and projects such as the Sarimanok Sports Stadium, convention center, barangay halls, and Peace Memorial Park became prominent elements of the state’s rehabilitation narrative. Authorities also conducted extensive clearing operations to remove debris and unexploded ordnance (UXO), allowing portions of the city to reopen gradually. These projects undeniably reshaped Marawi’s physical landscape. However, after nine years, the deeper question is whether reconstruction has genuinely improved the lives of those most affected by the conflict. The issue is not the presence of infrastructure, but the imbalance in priorities. While roads and public infrastructure advanced slowly, many displaced families continued to wait for stable housing, utilities, compensation, and long-term support.

Life Inside the Shelters

The limits of post-conflict rehabilitation are most evident in transitional and permanent shelter communities such as Gonsongan, along with Boganga, Lakeview, Rorogagus, Bahay Pag-asa, and Bakwit Village. These sites were originally intended as temporary relocation areas, yet many families remained there for years after the siege. Humanitarian reports repeatedly documented overcrowding, inadequate drainage, poor sanitation, and limited livelihood opportunities. Families who once owned homes and businesses in the MAA suddenly found themselves dependent on aid, living in cramped settlements where uncertainty gradually became normalized. For many residents, displacement no longer feels temporary. Transitional shelters meant to provide short-term refuge gradually became long-term spaces of waiting.

Struggling for Basic Needs

Access to water remains one of the most persistent concerns for displaced communities. As of 2025, humanitarian organizations and local agencies documented irregular water distribution, rationed deliveries, and inadequate sanitation at several relocation sites. In some communities, residents relied heavily on water tank deliveries because household connections were inadequate or unreliable. Access to electricity has also remained uneven. Years after relocation, some communities still faced unreliable power and insufficient street lighting. The contrast became increasingly difficult to ignore: while 80 billion pesos were invested in roads, sports complexes, and public buildings, many displaced families continued to struggle to secure clean water and reliable electricity. Food insecurity and unstable livelihoods added further pressure. As humanitarian assistance gradually declined, many families were left dependent on irregular income opportunities while trying to recover economically from the siege’s damage.

Children Growing Up in Displacement

Children have shouldered some of the heaviest burdens of prolonged displacement. In several relocation communities, families reported difficulty accessing schools due to transportation costs, overcrowded classrooms, and unstable living conditions. For parents, recovery is not only about rebuilding homes but also about preserving a sense of normal life for their children. Yet years after the siege, many young people continue to grow up in environments marked by uncertainty and limited opportunities. The long-term effects of displacement on education and social development remain among the least visible consequences of the conflict.

Compensation and Unfinished Justice

The creation of the Marawi Compensation Board (MCB) under the Marawi Siege Victims Compensation Act was widely welcomed as an important step toward recognizing the losses suffered by civilians. By 2025, the board had processed thousands of claims, approved P2.8 billion in claims, and disbursed approximately P2.02 billion in total compensation. Despite this progress, many survivors continued to express frustration with the slow, highly bureaucratic claims process. Families whose documents were destroyed during the war struggled to meet the documentation requirements to prove property ownership and damages. Others questioned whether financial compensation alone could ever fully address years of displacement, trauma, and disrupted livelihoods. For many residents, reparations are not simply about money. They are also about acknowledgment, dignity, and the restoration of trust.

Beyond Roads and Buildings

Nine years after the siege, Marawi remains caught between reconstruction and incomplete healing. Roads, stadiums, and memorial parks may symbolize progress, but genuine recovery cannot be measured by infrastructure alone. A city cannot be considered fully rehabilitated while many of its people still lack reliable utilities, adequate livelihoods, accessible education, and full reparations. The challenge facing Marawi today is no longer simply rebuilding what was destroyed. The greater challenge is ensuring that rehabilitation remains centered on people rather than on projects. Lasting peace requires more than physical reconstruction; it requires dignity, inclusion, justice, and meaningful participation by the communities most affected by the conflict. The siege may have officially ended in 2017, but for many displaced Mranaws, the struggle for dignified return, recognition, and genuine recovery continues long after the guns have fallen silent.

Keywords: Philippines, Marawi, reconstruction, justice, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

Jobs Before Guns: Why Youth Employment Matters for Peace in West Africa

By
Abubakari Najimu
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Sustainable fish farming leads to decent youth employment in West Africa - FAO

Across West Africa, governments and citizens are grappling with how to respond to violent extremism and militant recruitment. Security operations remain important, especially where communities face immediate threats. Yet security measures alone do not address all the conditions that allow violence to spread. 

One of the clearest lessons from emerging research is that economic exclusion, especially among young people, can quietly weaken the foundations of peace long before a crisis becomes visible. When large numbers of youth are unable to find stable work, meaningful opportunity, or a believable path to adulthood, armed groups may find it easier to recruit, persuade, and retain followers.

That is the central message of my recent study on West Africa. Using data from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal between 2000 and 2024. The study examines whether youth unemployment contributes to militant activity. Rather than relying only on simple association, it uses an approach designed to identify causal impact more credibly by tracing how changes in global commodity prices shape labour market conditions in economies that depend heavily on exports such as oil, cocoa, gold, uranium, and cotton. 

The core finding is striking: a one-percentage-point increase in youth unemployment is associated with around four additional militant events in a country in a given year. This suggests that youth unemployment should not be treated only as a development problem. It should also be understood as a peacebuilding and conflict-prevention issue.

Why this matters for peacebuilding

This finding matters because it shifts the policy conversation. Too often, employment is treated as a long-term social objective to be pursued after violence has been contained. The evidence points in the opposite direction. Jobs, livelihoods, and economic inclusion can be part of prevention itself. In fragile or conflict-affected settings, the absence of work is not simply the absence of income. It can also mean loss of dignity, blocked aspirations, weakened trust in public institutions, and greater vulnerability to actors who offer money, belonging, identity, or protection.

For ordinary families and communities, this dynamic is not abstract. A young person who cannot find decent work may remain dependent for years, delay key life transitions, and feel increasingly disconnected from society. In places where state presence is weak and local economies are under pressure, armed groups can exploit those frustrations. They do not recruit only with ideology; they also recruit through opportunity, status, and survival. That is why youth employment deserves greater attention within peacebuilding practice.

Three peacebuilding lessons from the study

The first lesson is that unemployment can lower the barrier to recruitment. When legitimate income is scarce, the opportunity cost of joining an armed group falls. Militant organizations may then appear more attractive, especially where they can offer cash, food, mobility, or a sense of purpose. Peacebuilding actors, therefore, need to view apprenticeships, technical training, local enterprise support, and labour-intensive community projects not as peripheral economic programmes but as practical tools of prevention. These interventions can help narrow the space in which armed groups operate. At the same time, their success depends on credibility, continuity, and local trust. Short-lived projects with weak follow-up may raise expectations without changing outcomes.

The second lesson is that joblessness can deepen grievance, while economic inclusion can help rebuild trust. Prolonged unemployment can fuel frustration, exclusion, and resentment, particularly among young people who believe that public institutions have little to offer them. In that context, militant narratives can gain traction by turning private disappointment into political anger. Well-designed employment initiatives can do more than generate income. They can restore dignity, strengthen belonging, and reconnect excluded youth to local institutions and community networks. But peacebuilding practice must remain realistic: jobs alone will not resolve all drivers of violence. Marginalization, governance failures, corruption, and unresolved local grievances also matter.

The third lesson is that resilience matters because economic shocks are unavoidable. Many West African economies remain heavily exposed to fluctuations in global commodity markets. When prices fall, employment conditions can deteriorate quickly, especially for youth already at the edge of the labour market. The study shows that these shocks can have security consequences, due to a rise in theft, survival crime, and the increased willingness of desperate youth to accept militant payments for intelligence or logistics. This gives governments and donors a practical agenda: diversify local economies, support sectors less vulnerable to price swings, and build rapid-response employment measures that can cushion downturns before insecurity worsens. Temporary public works, emergency livelihood support, and small-business recovery programmes may not solve structural unemployment, but they can reduce immediate pressures that armed groups exploit.

What a stronger response could look like

A more serious peacebuilding response would place youth employment alongside security, governance, and reconciliation rather than beneath them. 

First, governments should invest more consistently in local job pathways that are visible and accessible to vulnerable youth, especially outside capital cities. Skills programs work best when linked to real market demand, local value chains, and practical financing opportunities. 

Second, peacebuilding organizations should combine livelihood programs with civic participation, mentoring, psychosocial support, and trust-building so that economic inclusion is connected to social inclusion. 

Third, policymakers should pay closer attention to how global shocks filter into local instability. Conflict prevention should include plans for labour-market stress, not only plans for military escalation.

This approach also requires humility. Not every unemployed young person is at risk of joining an armed group, and militancy cannot be reduced to economics alone. Communities experience insecurity differently, and the causes of violence are layered. Even so, the evidence suggests that unemployment is one pressure point that policy can address more directly than many others. Ignoring it leaves peacebuilding strategies incomplete. Taking it seriously opens a pathway toward prevention that is more grounded in everyday realities.

 The bottom line

West Africa is unlikely to build lasting peace by focusing only on armed groups after they have already gained strength. It must also reduce the conditions that make recruitment easier in the first place. Youth unemployment is one of those conditions. Addressing it will not remove every source of conflict, but it can lower one of the pressures that helps violence grow. In that sense, creating economic opportunity for young people is not simply a development target. It is part of the long-term work of building peace, strengthening social trust, and giving communities a more credible alternative to violence.

Keywords: Joblessness, youth employment, West Africa, peace, conflict, conflict resolution, militant, recruitment

This Week in Peace #128: May 22

By
Tara Abhasakun
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Temples in Myanmar's Rakhine state, photo by Arezarni via Wikipedia.

This week, global outcry as South Sudan changes peace deal. Congolese academic pleas for peace amid Ebola outbreak. Rohingya survivors of Arakan Army massacre denied justice. 

Global Outcry as South Sudan’s President Changes Peace Deal

A global outcry is taking place now that South Sudan’s president unilaterally made changes to its 2018 peace deal. On May 19, the embassies of Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain and the United States released a joint statement urging South Sudan president Salva Kiir Mayardit immediately return to dialogue. 

The statement read, “Unilateral changes to the agreement are not in accordance with the letter and spirit of the agreement and will not bring peace to South Sudan.”

The outcry came after, on May 11, Kiir’s party made controversial changes to the peace deal removing key pre-election requirements, such as the permanent constitution making process and a national population census, from the electoral timeline.

Congolese Academic Pleas for Peace Amid Ebola Outbreak

A Congolese academic is pleading for peace amid a recent Ebola outbreak in the country. Dr. Hypolite Muhindo Mavoko, M.D., a professor in the Department of Tropical Medicine at the University of Kinshasa, appeared on France 24 on May 18 to provide an update on the Ebola crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 

Dr. Mavoko said the conflict in the region “contributed to delaying the identification of the outbreak because cases have been occurring in areas that are hard to reach with security issues. But I think this could also be high time to plead for, to push the peace agenda, the security agenda, so that people who have gone to the field can move easily and have possibilities to track the contact and identify the cases and isolate them.”

This development comes after M23 rebels withdrew from several areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on May 11 amidst pressure from the US to respect the ceasefire. Members of the armed group withdrew from Kabunambo, around 35 kilometers north of Uvira, to Luvungi, around 30 kilometers further north towards ​the provincial capital Bukavu. The withdrawal came two weeks after the U.S. imposed sanctions on former president Joseph Kabila over ​alleged links to M23. Kabila denies the allegations. 

Rohingya Survivors of Arakan Army Massacre Denied Justice

Myanmar’s Arakan Army, an ethnic army in Rakhine state, denies responsibility for its 2024 massacre of Rohingya Muslims. Survivors of the massacre are still unable to return to their homes, with many effectively detained, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a report on May 18. 

The report details brutal crimes against nearly 80 Rohingya villagers on May 2, 2024, based on interviews with 41 witnesses. The witnesses’ statements were corroborated through satellite imagery, along with photographs and videos posted to social media or shared with researchers. 

Myanmar’s military launched a brutal counter-insurgency and ethnic cleansing campaign against Rohingya  in 2017, forcing over 750,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh, joining earlier arrivals and forming the world’s largest refugee settlement. Today, over 1.2 million Rohingyas live in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char in densely crowded camps amid poverty and insecurity. Perpetrators of crimes against Rohingyas still have not been fully convicted.

Keywords: South Sudan, DRC, DR Congo, Congo, Myanmar, Rohingya, Arakan Army, massacre, Muslims, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

From Border Fears to Shared Futures: How South Asia Can Respond Differently to Climate Migration to Build Peace

By
Sheikh Mehzabin
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A fisherman navigates a shallow flooded area with his loaded boat, surrounded by nature. Photo by Adil Anhaf via Pexels.

In a crowded informal settlement on the outskirts of Dhaka, 38-year-old Rahima Begum recalls the night the river took her home. A former resident of Kurigram district in northern Bangladesh, she had already rebuilt her house twice after repeated floods. The third time, there was nothing left to rebuild. “I had land, I had neighbors, I had a life,” she says quietly. “Now I have to start from zero in a place where no one knows me.” Rahima’s experience is increasingly common in Bangladesh, where environmental pressures are steadily erasing homes, livelihoods, and long-standing community ties. Her story is not about crossing borders, but about survival, yet it is unfolding in a region where migration is increasingly framed through the lens of security. 

Across South Asia, governments have begun responding to climate-induced mobility with a mix of border tightening, surveillance measures, and political rhetoric centered on “illegal migration.” In neighboring India, migration debates are often entangled with domestic political narratives that emphasize demographic pressure and territorial control. While such approaches may resonate within national politics, they risk obscuring the environmental drivers of displacement and narrowing the space for cooperative solutions. Analysts warn that framing climate migration primarily as a security issue diverts attention from the long-term structural challenges of climate change, encouraging narratives of blame and border control rather than cooperation around shared environmental causes.  [IOM], 2023). Now more than ever, South Asian countries must cooperate to respond to climate migration in a way that builds peace. 

The scale of the crisis itself leaves little room for denial. Climate-induced displacement in Bangladesh is no longer a future scenario but an ongoing reality. The World Bank estimates that up to 13.3 million people in the country could be internally displaced by 2050 due to slow-onset climate impacts such as sea-level rise and salinity intrusion (World Bank, 2021). Each year, floods, cyclones, and riverbank erosion force millions in South Asia to relocate, often with minimal institutional support (IDMC, 2026). Bangladesh alone saw 1.3 million  new internal displacements due to floods in 2024 (IDMC, 2026). Coastal regions are becoming increasingly uninhabitable, agricultural productivity is declining, and river systems continue to reshape the landscape in unpredictable ways. As Bangladeshi climate expert Saleemul Huq has observed, “Many people… will simply not be able to continue there” (National Geographic, 2019). 

For most, migration is not a choice but a necessity. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of climate migration in South Asia remains internal, with displaced populations moving toward urban centers such as Dhaka. These cities, already under strain, are absorbing new arrivals at a rapid pace, creating additional pressure on housing, infrastructure, and employment systems. Yet even as migration remains largely domestic, its political implications are increasingly regional. Climate change acts as what scholars describe as a “threat multiplier,” intensifying existing inequalities and vulnerabilities rather than directly causing conflict (United Nations, 2022). 

When governments respond through securitization rather than cooperation, these underlying tensions risk becoming more pronounced. This is where the current trajectory begins to show its limits. Regional mechanisms such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have historically struggled to address politically sensitive issues like migration, leaving countries to respond in fragmented and often reactive ways. Yet climate-induced displacement does not respect national boundaries in its causes or consequences. River systems, weather patterns, and ecological disruptions are inherently transboundary, making unilateral approaches both insufficient and unsustainable.

A shift toward cooperation, however, offers a different pathway, one that aligns more closely with both the realities of climate change and the principles of peacebuilding. At the regional level, this could begin with renewed efforts to strengthen climate diplomacy. Joint risk assessments, shared data on displacement trends, and coordinated disaster response mechanisms would not only improve preparedness but also help depoliticize migration by grounding it in evidence rather than rhetoric. Such cooperation would require political will, but it is far from unprecedented; South Asia has a history of collaboration in areas such as disaster management that could be expanded to address climate mobility. 

Equally important is the need to move from a narrow focus on state security to a broader understanding of human security. This approach prioritizes the safety, dignity, and livelihoods of individuals rather than treating them as potential threats. In practical terms, it involves recognizing climate-induced displacement within policy frameworks, ensuring access to essential services for affected populations, and protecting migrants from exploitation and marginalization. At present, there is no formal recognition of “climate refugees” under international law, leaving millions in a legal gray area. The United Nations has increasingly emphasized the importance of rights-based approaches to climate mobility, encouraging countries to integrate migration into national adaptation strategies (MDPI, 2025). 

At the local level, solutions are already emerging, often driven by the very communities most affected. Across Bangladesh, adaptation strategies such as flood-resistant housing, floating agriculture, and community-based disaster preparedness are helping to reduce vulnerability and, in some cases, delay or prevent displacement. Investing in these initiatives can strengthen resilience while also reducing the likelihood of conflict over scarce resources. 

In areas where migrants settle, community dialogue and inclusive development policies can play a crucial role in easing tensions between newcomers and host populations, ensuring that migration does not become a source of social fragmentation (IOM, 2023). Urban areas, too, must be reimagined as part of the solution. Cities like Dhaka are on the frontline of climate migration, but they also offer opportunities for innovation. By integrating migration into urban planning, through affordable housing, resilient infrastructure, and inclusive labor markets, governments can transform cities from sites of crisis into spaces of adaptation. 

Collaboration between cities across South Asia could further enhance these efforts, allowing policymakers to share strategies and lessons learned in managing climate-induced mobility. 

None of these efforts, however, can succeed without meaningful international support. Climate finance remains heavily skewed toward mitigation, with insufficient resources allocated to adaptation and displacement management. Increasing investment in resilience-building, planned relocation programs, and livelihood support would help address the root causes of migration rather than merely its symptoms. Global actors also have a role to play in encouraging cooperative frameworks, ensuring that climate migration is approached as a shared challenge rather than a competitive one (European Comission, 2026).

Rahima Begum’s story is a reminder that behind every statistic is a life disrupted and a future uncertain. Yet it is also a reminder that the choices made by governments today will shape the region’s trajectory for decades to come. A response defined by fear and securitization risks turning environmental change into political conflict. A response grounded in cooperation, by contrast, offers the possibility of stability, resilience, and peace. As climate pressures intensify, South Asia stands at a crossroads. It can continue down a path of fragmentation, where borders harden and mistrust deepens. Or it can choose a different direction, one that recognizes shared vulnerabilities and builds collective solutions.

In the face of rising waters, the most sustainable path forward may not be to retreat behind borders, but to move forward together.

Keywords: Climate refugees, South Asia, Climate change, Asia, Bangladesh, India, Climate migration, migration

Five Ways Ethiopia’s Oromo Women Build Peace at the Grassroots

By
Meseret Geneti
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A group of Oromo women dressed in Guji Oromo clothing, photo by Mekonnen B.Gedefa via Wikipedia.

The Oromo people are the largest national group in Eastern Africa, numbering around 40 percent of the population of Ethiopia. They have rich experiential knowledge of peacebuilding embedded in their system of governance, the Gadaa system. However, the past few years have shown a pattern of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, with some efforts in peacebuilding. Amidst this situation, Oromo women’s peacebuilding roles within their communities and the challenges they face deserve attention.

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122) highlight how conflicts disproportionately affect women and mandate their inclusion. However, the prevailing discourse in both research and practice indicates that the significant involvement of women is still the missing ingredient on peace tables at the international level, and women’s voices are rarely heard beyond their own communities.  

The Oromo women of Ethiopia play a crucial role in peacebuilding by acting as peace missionaries, agents of ceasefires, guardians of women’s rights, and mediators through their institution known as the siinqee institution. Siinqee (or siiqqee) is a long, thin ritual stick given to married Oromo women on their wedding day. It serves as a non-violent emblem of authority, justice, and protection. Siingee embodies the power and influence a woman needs to defend her rights, protect herself, and stand for peace and justice in a nonviolent way. Thus, it is described as “a woman’s weapon.”

The siinqee institution is an organized civic force of siinqee bearers (married women) within the Oromo society. During intercommunal and intra-communal conflicts or wars, if women carrying siinqee intervene among the warring parties, fighting ceases immediately. Then, helping the wounded, finding the dead, and post-conflict peacebuilding are facilitated. Overall, the siinqee institution empowers women to act for peace education, human rights advocacy, and awareness raising, promoting humanitarian and social welfare, peacemaking and preventing diplomacy, and spiritual mediation and harmony making. 

There are five ways Oromo women do this. The first way is through the Oromo people’s customary law, which is known as muka-laafaa (or muka-laaftuu), roughly translated as ‘softwood.’ The underlying concept of ‘softwood’ does not indicate that women are weak or inferior. Instead, it establishes a system against the exploitation of women. Thus, Oromo women enjoy special rights by virtue of being “soft” or liminal, with Oromo society bearing a duty to respect, protect, and fulfill women. The law is part of the egalitarian governance system of Gadaa.

Second, violators of women’s rights are disqualified from Gadaa elections, which are meritocratic. Oromo women use naming and shaming methods similar to what civil society does in broader human rights systems. They practice this as part of their daily lives.

Third, when their rights are violated, Oromo women grab their siinqee, burst out of their houses, and scream. This is a way of mobilizing each other and spreading information about the deterioration of moral order. Then, they gather under an oak tree, referred to as a ‘women’s tree’ and hold peace talks, finding a way for reconciliation and restoration of justice. Oromo women often won’t return home before the peaceful resolution of the conflict and without the triumph of justice over injustice.

Fourth, Oromo women have the power to bless and curse. Due to the fear of a curse, people avoid what they believe would trigger women’s wrath. On the other hand, after elders come to hear women’s decisions and fulfill their demands, the peace process is concluded by a blessing. Women give wet grass to the participants and the offender as a sign of peace. 

Lastly, in case of severe transgressions, women trek to cross water (life’s source), signaling total disorder, and refuse to return without a resolution.  Men in the community gather and choose a mediator, usually an elder, to bring the community back to peacefulness. If the women find the elder worthy to mediate, they proceed to a peace talk, identifying the root cause of the conflict, deciding a punishment or compensation for the victim (restorative justice), and concluding with reconciliation and re-integration.  

The above methods embody Oromo peace ideals: effort, truth, restorative justice, compensation and punishment, reconciliation- spanning prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. However, despite its contributions to peacebuilding, the institution has faced and continues to face challenges. Among others, politics-driven socio-political structures, political ideologies, and biased policies have adversely affected the existence, practice, and growth of the siinqee institution. Moreover, the introduction of Christianity and Islam in the Oromo society has hindered siinqee’s peacebuilding roles, as it is dominated by religious leaders. The advancement of modernization, the “modern” legal system, and non-integration of cultural values into formal education have also imposed a negative impact on the progression of siinqee. In the face of these challenges, the institution is striving to contribute to peacebuilding. 

Keywords: Ethiopia, Ethiopian, Oromo, women, peace, women peacebuilders, Gadaa, democratic, conflict, conflict resolution, siinqee

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