Home Blog Page 3

Women’s Political Participation: A Path to Violence-Free Elections in Nigeria

By
Mohammed Ibrahim
-
0
Dr. Lydia Umar of Gender Awareness Trust, photo by Mohammed Ibrahim.

As Nigeria prepares for another electoral cycle ahead of the 2027 general elections, concerns over political violence, voter intimidation, and electoral insecurity continue to dominate national conversations. 

Across the country, civil society groups, women leaders, and peace advocates are increasingly calling for greater inclusion of women in politics, arguing that women’s participation could play a significant role in reducing electoral violence and promoting peaceful democratic engagement.

Nigeria has a long history of election-related violence. The 2011 post-election crisis remains one of the deadliest in the country’s democratic history. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), more than 800 people were killed in post-election violence that erupted across 12 northern states after the presidential election. 

The violence displaced thousands and exposed the deep political and ethnic tensions surrounding elections in the country.

Ahead of the 2027 elections, concerns about violence resurfaced, but many observers believe that increasing women’s participation in politics may help change the tone of political engagement in Nigeria.

Former commissioner for human services and social development and chieftain of the African Democratic Congress (ADC), Hafsat Mohammed Baba believes women can contribute significantly to peaceful elections if political parties genuinely create space for them.

According to her, women are naturally advocates of peace and inclusion. She said that when women are involved in any decision for the progress of a nation, they give their very best, including by promoting peace and avoiding electoral violence.

However, she noted that many women face serious obstacles within political parties, especially during party primaries. “At the initial stage, women normally come out to participate, but you find out that they are being edged out, most especially at the primary elections,” she said.

She described how violence and intimidation often discourage women from contesting. “The majority of the men come with thugs, and then they disrupt the primaries,” Baba stated. “Once there is violence, people will be running for their lives.”

Despite these challenges, she insisted that women should remain determined to participate in politics, stressing that it is better for women to go to the polls and lose than to step down.

Baba also recounted her personal experience with political intimidation. “There was a time when I was the National Woman Leader, and a woman was contesting. I was asked to ensure that she stepped down for a man, which I said I would not do,” she recalled.

 “At the end of the day, I was locked up in the party headquarters for almost one day because I refused.”

For grassroots peacebuilding, she emphasized sensitization, dialogue, and advocacy. She added that the media was a very important tool since there are programs dedicated to nonviolent elections. Other important institutions, she said, include traditional institutions, religious institutions, and engaging with men as partners in progress.

Dr. Lydia Umar, the executive director of Gender Awareness Trust, offered a more cautious perspective. While she supports increased women’s participation in politics, she argued that participation alone may not automatically reduce violence.

“If anything, it is when women participate that they become more exposed to such violence because many people see them as a threat.”

She explained that many women avoid politics because of fear. “The fear of being attacked and the fear of violence make them feel that it is not worth it, so they prefer to stay at home,” Dr. Umar said. Still, she stressed that women must continue demanding their constitutional rights.

On the role of grassroots women’s groups, Dr. Umar emphasized peace advocacy and community influence.“They can help by advocating for peaceful elections and by promoting peace themselves,” she said. 

She added, “They should also discourage young people and their children from participating in violence.”

Research and international studies increasingly support the idea that inclusive governance contributes to democratic stability. The United Nations Women, Peace and Security framework argues that women’s participation in governance strengthens conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

Studies from Lund University have also shown that women are more likely to prioritize dialogue, social welfare, and peaceful conflict resolution. A 2020 study by the university found that the Women’s Situation Room initiative helped reduce risks of electoral violence during Nigeria’s 2015 elections. Women-led mediation and early warning systems reportedly improved community trust and helped address election-related tensions before they escalated.

Despite this evidence, women remain significantly underrepresented in Nigerian politics. A report by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre revealed that Nigeria ranks among the lowest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in women’s parliamentary representation.

Out of Nigeria’s 360-member House of Representatives, only 16 are women, while just four women serve in the 109-member Senate. Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, no woman has been elected president, vice president, or governor.

This poor representation contrasts sharply with demographic realities. According to the World Bank, women and girls constitute nearly half of Nigeria’s population.

Peace advocate and youth empowerment promoter Eric John believes societal attitudes continue to discourage women from entering politics. “Politics in this environment is highly competitive and often harsh,” he said.

Eric sensitizing women and youth in one of the communities on their electoral rights. Photo by Mohammed Ibrahim.

He noted that women often bring calmer and more peaceful approaches to political activities. “During rallies and campaigns, women often encourage calmness, vigilance, and lawfulness,” he explained. “In many cases, rallies led or strongly supported by women tend to have less involvement of thugs or disruptive elements.”

According to him, most violent political incidents are usually associated with male-dominated political structures, and women are more likely to de-escalate tensions, even calling on their supporters to avoid confrontation..

Similarly, Halima Akilu Yunusa, a Kaduna State House of Assembly aspirant from Kajuru Local Government Area, believes women’s natural protective instincts make them less likely to support violence.

Halima Yunusa Kajuru aspiring for State House of Assembly, photo by Mohammed Ibrahim.

“A mother would never support anything that could harm her child,” she said. “Because women are protective by nature, they would not want to send another person’s child into danger either.”

She argued that women politicians rarely encourage political thuggery, nor do they supply drugs to youth to encourage bad behavior.

According to her, increasing women’s representation could significantly reduce election violence.“If women could occupy even 30 percent of political positions, they would know how to properly control and guide the youth so that campaigns would remain peaceful,” she said.

Coordinator of Peace Network Journalists Ibrahima Yakubu also believes women-led political movements tend to encourage peaceful campaigns.

However, he noted that peaceful politics ultimately depends on values and leadership styles, not gender alone.

While increasing women’s participation may not completely eliminate electoral violence, advocates insist it can help create a more peaceful political culture rooted in dialogue, inclusion, and community engagement.

Keywords: Nigeria, women, political, participation, involvement, election, election violence, peace, conflict, conflict resolution, Nigerian

This Week in Peace #129: May 29

By
Tara Abhasakun
-
0
Bunia, the capital city of Ituri province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Photo by Julien Harneis via Wikipedia.

This week, China and Pakistan vow to cooperate Afghanistan. World Health Organization (WHO) urges ceasefire amidst Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s Ebola outbreak. Myanmar’s hunger crisis.

China and Pakistan Vow to Cooperate on Afghanistan

On May 26, China and Pakistan released a joint statement stressing the need to prevent militant groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and others from using Afghan territory for terrorist activities. 

The statement followed a visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China, in which he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. The two countries welcomed the idea of forming a continuing dialogue between Pakistan and the Taliban authorities. Pakistan’s foreign ministry said that China and Pakistan agreed to continue to coordinate on Afghanistan-related issues.

The heavy death toll of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s conflict is coming to light. On May 12, the UN reported that at least 372 Afghan civilians, including an NGO worker, were killed in conflict between government forces and Pakistan in the first three months of the year. Pakistan wrote a response to the report saying that 130 Pakistani civilians and security personnel were killed since the beginning of this year.

Pakistan accuses the Taliban in Afghanistan of harboring militants who attack Pakistan. Meanwhile, Afghan officials claim that that Pakistan harbours hostile groups and does not respect its sovereignty, RTL Today reports. The UN’s office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs in Afghanistan posted on X on April 7 that the conflict had displaced 94,000 people.

WHO Urges Ceasefire Amid DRC’s Ebola Outbreak

Two weeks after the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the chief of the World Health Organization (WHO) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus is urging an immediate ceasefire in the country’s conflict-devastated eastern region. 

Tedros said on X, “Stopping this Ebola transmission depends entirely on humanitarian access. Yet ongoing clashes are driving mass displacement, pushing exposed contacts into overcrowded camps and severing critical containment corridors.”

Tedros added that attacks on health facilities make tracking cases and their contacts “nearly impossible.” WHO reports that as of May 24, there are 900 suspected cases and 223 suspected Ebola deaths in the DRC and seven confirmed cases and one death in Uganda.

Despite being under government control, insecurity is worsening in eastern DRC’s Ituri province, with the UN humanitarian office reporting nearly 1 million displaced in the province. 

Myanmar’s Hunger Crisis

Five years after Myanmar’s coup of February 2021, an estimated 16.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance this year, according to the UN humanitarian office’s Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 for Myanmar, published on May 27. 

Last week, the United Nations Regional Information Centre (UNRIC) for Western Europe reported that the Middle East crisis was putting pressure on people across Myanmar to meet their basic needs. The UNRIC noted that fuel prices have tripled in Myanmar, and, “On average, staple food prices are up 18 percent nationwide, with Magway Region recording the highest increase at 38 percent, followed by Kayin and Rakhine states at 32 and 31 percent respectively.”

Keywords: China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Taliban, DRC, Congo, DR Congo, Ebola, Myanmar, hunger, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

Success and Uncertainty in Somaliland’s Peacebuilding Journey

By
Jamal Abdi
-
0
People in Hargeisa, photo by Clay Gilliland via Wikipedia.

Somaliland finds itself at a critical juncture. On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first sovereign state to formally recognize Somaliland, which remains a partially recognized state. Somaliland’s journey getting to this point involved a long period of peacebuilding and state-building.

Following a decade of civil war in the country from 1982 to 1991, communities that had fought on opposing sides voluntarily negotiated, ceased hostilities, consolidated peace, and forged an inclusive democratic state from scratch without external involvement. Relying on culture-specific customs, Somalilanders were able to sustain large-scale cooperation and effectively tackle social dilemmas. A key characteristic of Somaliland’s formative peace and state-building period (1991-2001) is that all major decisions—with the exception of electing presidents—were reached through consensus. 

Beyond Kinship

In a recently published article based on fieldwork, including interviews with key actors, I analyze Somaliland’s peace and state-building trajectory through the lens of cooperation and collective action. The article unpacks the cultural sources that fostered widespread pro-social behavior, which ultimately enabled Somalilanders to consolidate peace and build a functioning democratic state without external support. As detailed in the above-mentioned article, there are numerous examples of pro-social behavior that proved crucial during Somaliland’s gestation. These included, but were not limited to, interventions by elders, women, and members of the diaspora aimed at peacefully resolving conflicts and fostering reconciliation. The article shifts the focus of analysis from kinship—social relationships that tie people together— to the traditional legal system, xeer, and offers a reconceptualization of the latter. 

The literature on Somaliland, which is overwhelmingly produced by non-Somalis, does occasionally discuss xeer as an explanatory and analytical framework, but subsumes it under the kinship system, places primacy on the latter, and views it as an overarching structure. Moreover, xeer is usually considered concrete contracts or treaties between social groups, with little to no attention allocated to xeer as a broader system offering meaningful and independent explanatory power.

In offering a reconceptualization of xeer, I suggest that it is better understood as a shared normative order that defines the “rules of the game,” governs socio-political relations, and which effectively functions as a regime – i.e., a political system. People in Somaliland share the same religion (Islam), speak the same language (Somali), share a common culture and history. Somaliland, in other words, is characterized by uniformity of values. By conforming to the values and beliefs of a society characterized by a high degree of homogeneity, xeer derives its greater legitimacy from society’s external ultimate sources of authority, namely Islam and Somali culture. This alignment turns xeer into a moral authority defining acceptable behavior. Put shortly, the contents of xeer are broadly considered legitimate by people in Somaliland. By exerting moral and normative constraint upon behavior, it induces pro-social behavior. 

In addition to xeer, institutionalized and widespread socially rational behavior stemming from intercommunal interdependence also played a crucial role in fostering pro-social behavior. These mutually constitutive factors operate beyond and independently of the kinship structure.

Lessons from Somaliland 

While meaningfully understanding Somaliland requires a deep dive into its social dimensions, exemplified by xeer, it is erroneous to assume that the country holds no valuable lessons for other societies. In important ways, Somaliland succeeded because of the lack of external intervention rather than despite it. By steering their own peacebuilding trajectory, Somalilanders were not constrained by external donors in terms of timeframes or institutional endpoints. They were free to proceed as they saw fit and to pursue solutions, they deemed appropriate. Most importantly, the absence of external intervention meant that Somalilanders themselves interpreted their culture and determined how best to tap into it. 

Had Somaliland been subjected to external intervention, as was the case in Somalia, it is likely that external experts – often Global North scholars who usually lack linguistic competence and cultural literacy – would have been treated as the primary authorities on Somaliland’s culture, customs, institutions etc. This is indeed what happened in Somalia, with catastrophic consequences. The international community’s approach to peace and state-building in Somalia was strongly grounded in knowledge produced by non-Somalis, based on the assumption that kinship is the all-pervasive and overarching structure. The combination of excluding critical Somali scholars, and some domestic actors’ incentives to adopt the vocabulary and expectations of the international community, reinforced and reproduced the centrality of kinship. 

In this sense, an important lesson from Somaliland is that people from conflict-affected societies are the primary authorities on their own culture, even when their interpretations clash with prevailing ideas and paradigms in Western academia. Much has been written about epistemic injustice, yet unfortunately, little has changed. Perhaps the most important lesson from Somaliland is that effective peacebuilding does not necessarily require external intervention, contrary to what is often assumed in mainstream peacebuilding theory. While the sources of pro-social behavior in Somaliland are context-specific, it is important to note that Somalilanders are not uniquely predisposed to socially rational conduct. Multidisciplinary research consistently shows that people are not merely narrowly self-interested. Rather, they usually care greatly about justice and fairness and are often willing to forego private payoffs for the collective good. Further research is needed to explore how this type of scholarship might inform peacebuilding.

Somaliland at a Crossroads With Challenges Ahead

For Israel, Somaliland represents a strategic asset, given its location in the Horn of Africa, directly across from Yemen. For Somaliland, the expectation was that diplomatic rapprochement with Israel would encourage other states – most notably the United States – to follow suit. While it is too soon to conclude the consequences of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, it is worth noting that it has already amplified geo-strategic tensions on the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East.

Unsurprisingly, Somalia views Israel’s move as a violation of its sovereignty, a position supported by several regional actors, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Djibouti. The situation is further complicated by China’s firm backing of Somalia, driven in part by its opposition to Somaliland’s independence given Somaliland’s close ties with Taiwan. As a result, Somaliland finds itself at a critical juncture. It is increasingly uncertain whether it can continue in its current form over the next decade or two. Facing mounting pressure from multiple powerful actors, a significant shift in its status appears potentially decisive.

Keywords: Somaliland, Israel, Somali, Somalis, culture, pro-social behavior, Africa, Horn of Africa, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

Manipur’s Fragile Calm: Peace Spoilers, Fragmented Conflict and the Limits of Silence in One Indian State

By
Haobijam Brijesh Singh
-
0

The Northeastern Indian state of Manipur is at a critical juncture between the remnants of violence and fragile peace. Since the 2023 ethnic conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, large-scale clashes have decreased, but underlying tensions remain. Displacement continues, mobility is restricted, and daily life is divided along ethnic lines. This calmness is a precarious management of unresolved crises. Stephen John Stedman’s ‘peace spoilers’ framework is relevant here. Stedman identifies spoilers as actors with specific demands, ‘greedy’ actors driven by financial incentives, and ‘total’ spoilers rejecting settlements (Stedman, 1997). These spoilers hinder peace, showing that instability can benefit some politically and economically.

Conflicting factors, including border insecurity, politicized migrant narratives, illegal economies, militarized responses, interethnic tensions, and ambiguous state involvement, fuel Manipur’s crisis. Recognizing and addressing these issues is crucial for lasting peace in Manipur.

Borderlands Without Borders

Historically, Manipur’s border with Myanmar has been a social area, not a strict geopolitical line. Both sides have ethnic populations with familial, commercial, and cultural ties predating the state borders (Baruah, 2005). However, since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, this flexibility has been increasingly securitized. Thousands fled to Manipur because of the ensuing violence (Indian Council of World Affairs, 2025). Security and demographic threat rhetoric redefined what could be considered a humanitarian issue. Narratives depict these people as ‘illegal immigrants’ disrupting local stability or as co-ethnic refugees needing protection. These tales, as peace spoilers, are political tools rather than objective descriptions (Stedman, 1997). By portraying identity as in peril, they increase fear, limit compromise, and make moderation more difficult.

Narco-Economy and the Political Economy of Instability

Manipur’s proximity to the Golden Triangle, a major narcotics-producing area, exacerbates border issues. It is a key drug transit corridor from Myanmar to India (Government of India, NCB Reports 2024; The Economic Times, 2026). Scholars have noted that criminal networks exploit weak governance, involving armed actors, informal protection, and local power brokers (Hazarika, 2024). Stability aids regulation, and volatility creates opportunities. Stedman describes these actors as ‘greedy spoilers,’ whose peace commitment varies according to their financial interests (Stedman, 1997). The narco-economy in Manipur disincentivizes normalization, making instability advantageous for some groups.

Militias and Fragmented Authority

The erosion of trust in state protection has led to the emergence of local militias and community defense groups (Singh & Garai, 2025). Initially established in response to insecurity, these entities have fragmented Manipur’s territory and society. The valley and hill regions now function as segregated areas with restricted movement and reinforced boundaries. Civilian militarization has created multiple power centers beyond formal state control. These groups’mobilization reinforces divisions, complicates the return of displaced populations, and increases disarmament costs. Achieving peace requires security guarantees and restructuring local power relations—an outcome none of the actors sees as beneficial.

Emerging Inter-Ethnic Frictions: The Naga–Kuki Dimension

Although often seen as a binary confrontation, recent Naga-Kuki tensions have shown the conflict’s expansion and fragmentation. These frictions stem from overlapping territorial claims, competing customary authorities, and historical mistrust. Recent Ukhrul violence, including the March–April 2026 clashes in Sinakeithei with armed exchanges, fatalities, and house burnings, highlights how quickly tensions escalate (Singh, 2026; Ukhrul Times, 2026). 

This indicates that Manipur’s conflict is no longer a single inter-ethnic axis but has diffused into multiple arenas. This shift transforms it from a bipolar confrontation to a complex, multi-layered field—what Bourdieu (1990) calls a social field with actors competing for power, legitimacy and control. This is significant within the peace spoiler framework, increasing the number of actors whose interests may not align with a settlement, complicating negotiations (Stedman, 1997). As alliances shift, instability is sustained and reproduced through the competition of insecurities.

Expanding Conflict, Diffusing Instability

Recent incidents, such as targeted killings and sporadic bomb attacks, along with violence spreading to new areas, show that the conflict is evolving rather than being contained. The April 7, 2026, rocket attack in Tronglaobi, which killed two children and injured their mother, highlights this shift (India Today, 2026). This attack, occurring early in the day in Tronglaobi Awang Leikai, Bishnupur district, caused civil unrest. Targeting civilians, especially children, increases fear and entrenches narratives of victimhood and retaliation, reinforcing the perception of existential threats. This illustrates a core feature of spoiler dynamics: violence need not be continuous to achieve its aims. Strategic disruptions at critical moments can derail stabilization efforts and perpetually defer reconciliation (Stedman, 1997).

The Politics of Silence

An equally critical aspect of the crisis involves the central government, led by Narendra Modi. Despite deploying security forces and intensifying border management, there is a lack of sustained political engagement and public communication. This silence may reflect the political sensitivity of intervening in a polarized ethnic landscape, where any action risks being seen as partisan. This creates a paradox in the Manipur crisis: a visible coercive state with an absent political voice.

In a peace spoiler framework, such silence may inadvertently foster spoiler activities. The absence of a political roadmap creates a vacuum in which competing actors define the conflict (Stedman, 1997). Consequently, narratives become entrenched, misinformation spreads, and mistrust deepens. For historically marginalized communities, silence can signal indifference or partiality, eroding their confidence in institutional neutrality (Baruah, 2005; Singh & Garai, 2026). However, peace requires credible signaling, inclusive dialogue, and a shared political vision.

Rethinking Peace in Manipur

The situation in Manipur challenges traditional conflict resolution paradigms. Reducing violence is necessary but insufficient; underlying instability must be addressed. The peace spoiler framework offers the following insights: instability yields benefits, identity narratives mobilize, illicit economies resist peace, fragmentation complicates negotiations, and ambiguous state signals expand spoiler opportunities. Simplifying social actors into reductive categories is problematic. Many resist peace processes because of fear, exclusion, and uncertainty. 

Applying the peace spoiler framework to Manipur demands a nuanced approach. The absence of a definitive ‘total spoiler’ is a call to recognize intricate dynamics. While violence and hardline stances suggest opposition, most stakeholders have conditional objectives—seeking security, control, or recognition without rejecting coexistence. This is not a simple obstruction; it is a complex pattern of distributed spoiling, where armed factions, militias, elites, and networks subtly undermine peace efforts. In this fragmented landscape, defensive mobilization risks exclusion, and local interests hinder reconciliation. Manipur’s situation is unique: instability is fueled by overlapping spoiler dynamics where fear, mistrust, and incentives converge. Framing the conflict as a singular “total spoiler” oversimplifies and risks deepening polarization. Embracing this complexity is imperative for genuine and sustainable peace.

Conclusion

Manipur is not merely a post-conflict society inching toward peace; it is a region where peace is actively negotiated, challenged, and at times undermined. To truly understand the dynamics at play, it is imperative to recognize peace spoilers—both structural and apparent—without unjustly attributing blame to specific communities. The focus must be on the evolving circumstances that enable such disruptions and, in some cases, justify them.

This fragile state will persist until critical issues such as border administration, migratory narratives, illicit economic activities, militia influence, inter-ethnic tensions, and political leadership are decisively addressed. The instability in Manipur is not a mere consequence of violence disrupting peace; it is a systematically constructed and negotiated reality deemed essential by some. It is time to confront these challenges head-on and pave the way for a truly peaceful future.

Nine Years After Marawi: Can Reconstruction Truly Heal a Wounded City in the Philippines?

By
Raihan A. Yusoph
-
0
The Sarimanok Sport Stadium in MAA. Photo captured by Raihan Yusoph, May 15, 2026.

Nine years after the Marawi Siege, the Philippine government continues to present rehabilitation as a success story measured by highways, public buildings, sports complexes, and ceremonial inaugurations. Yet beneath the polished language of “recovery” lies a more troubling reality. Thousands of displaced Mranaw (People of Lanao) families still struggle to reclaim stable lives, while the state’s post-conflict framework remains deeply centered on visible infrastructure rather than human rehabilitation. Marawi today stands as a city rebuilt in appearance but still fractured in substance. Concrete has risen from the ruins of war, but justice, dignified return, and social recovery remain painfully incomplete.

The siege that erupted on 23 May 2017 between government forces and the Maute Group transformed Marawi into the site of the deadliest urban conflict in recent Philippine history. What began as a security operation escalated into a five-month war that devastated the Islamic city, displaced entire communities, and left deep psychological scars on the people of Lanao. Government records estimated that about 77,170 families, or more than 353,921 people, were displaced by the conflict, while official casualty reports documented the deaths of government troops, civilians, and militants. Entire neighborhoods within the Most Affected Area (MAA) were reduced to rubble, forcing residents to evacuate to temporary shelters and settlements throughout Lanao del Sur and neighboring provinces. In response, the Duterte administration established the Inter-Agency Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) through Administrative Order No. 3, assigning it responsibility for rebuilding the city and normalizing civilian life.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction through Infrastructure

Over the years, reconstruction has become closely associated with large-scale infrastructure projects intended to symbolize recovery and modernization. Road networks were rebuilt across the MAA, and projects such as the Sarimanok Sports Stadium, convention center, barangay halls, and Peace Memorial Park became prominent elements of the state’s rehabilitation narrative. Authorities also conducted extensive clearing operations to remove debris and unexploded ordnance (UXO), allowing portions of the city to reopen gradually. These projects undeniably reshaped Marawi’s physical landscape. However, after nine years, the deeper question is whether reconstruction has genuinely improved the lives of those most affected by the conflict. The issue is not the presence of infrastructure, but the imbalance in priorities. While roads and public infrastructure advanced slowly, many displaced families continued to wait for stable housing, utilities, compensation, and long-term support.

Life Inside the Shelters

The limits of post-conflict rehabilitation are most evident in transitional and permanent shelter communities such as Gonsongan, along with Boganga, Lakeview, Rorogagus, Bahay Pag-asa, and Bakwit Village. These sites were originally intended as temporary relocation areas, yet many families remained there for years after the siege. Humanitarian reports repeatedly documented overcrowding, inadequate drainage, poor sanitation, and limited livelihood opportunities. Families who once owned homes and businesses in the MAA suddenly found themselves dependent on aid, living in cramped settlements where uncertainty gradually became normalized. For many residents, displacement no longer feels temporary. Transitional shelters meant to provide short-term refuge gradually became long-term spaces of waiting.

Struggling for Basic Needs

Access to water remains one of the most persistent concerns for displaced communities. As of 2025, humanitarian organizations and local agencies documented irregular water distribution, rationed deliveries, and inadequate sanitation at several relocation sites. In some communities, residents relied heavily on water tank deliveries because household connections were inadequate or unreliable. Access to electricity has also remained uneven. Years after relocation, some communities still faced unreliable power and insufficient street lighting. The contrast became increasingly difficult to ignore: while 80 billion pesos were invested in roads, sports complexes, and public buildings, many displaced families continued to struggle to secure clean water and reliable electricity. Food insecurity and unstable livelihoods added further pressure. As humanitarian assistance gradually declined, many families were left dependent on irregular income opportunities while trying to recover economically from the siege’s damage.

Children Growing Up in Displacement

Children have shouldered some of the heaviest burdens of prolonged displacement. In several relocation communities, families reported difficulty accessing schools due to transportation costs, overcrowded classrooms, and unstable living conditions. For parents, recovery is not only about rebuilding homes but also about preserving a sense of normal life for their children. Yet years after the siege, many young people continue to grow up in environments marked by uncertainty and limited opportunities. The long-term effects of displacement on education and social development remain among the least visible consequences of the conflict.

Compensation and Unfinished Justice

The creation of the Marawi Compensation Board (MCB) under the Marawi Siege Victims Compensation Act was widely welcomed as an important step toward recognizing the losses suffered by civilians. By 2025, the board had processed thousands of claims, approved P2.8 billion in claims, and disbursed approximately P2.02 billion in total compensation. Despite this progress, many survivors continued to express frustration with the slow, highly bureaucratic claims process. Families whose documents were destroyed during the war struggled to meet the documentation requirements to prove property ownership and damages. Others questioned whether financial compensation alone could ever fully address years of displacement, trauma, and disrupted livelihoods. For many residents, reparations are not simply about money. They are also about acknowledgment, dignity, and the restoration of trust.

Beyond Roads and Buildings

Nine years after the siege, Marawi remains caught between reconstruction and incomplete healing. Roads, stadiums, and memorial parks may symbolize progress, but genuine recovery cannot be measured by infrastructure alone. A city cannot be considered fully rehabilitated while many of its people still lack reliable utilities, adequate livelihoods, accessible education, and full reparations. The challenge facing Marawi today is no longer simply rebuilding what was destroyed. The greater challenge is ensuring that rehabilitation remains centered on people rather than on projects. Lasting peace requires more than physical reconstruction; it requires dignity, inclusion, justice, and meaningful participation by the communities most affected by the conflict. The siege may have officially ended in 2017, but for many displaced Mranaws, the struggle for dignified return, recognition, and genuine recovery continues long after the guns have fallen silent.

Keywords: Philippines, Marawi, reconstruction, justice, peace, conflict, conflict resolution

1234...187Page 3 of 187