Niger

Niger became independent from France in 1960, and was under repressive authoritarian and then military rule until 1993. Despite occasional coups or coup attempts and the repressive nature of the regimes in power during this period, there was no widespread violent conflict in Niger for much of this time. In 1990, Tuareg groups rebelled against the government, beginning a 5-year civil conflict. Fighting was sporadic, but the government’s response was harsh. The conflict ended in 1995 with a peace agreement; however, total peace was elusive. One year later, Ibrahim Baré seized power in a coup against a democratically elected government, later winning an election accompanied by significant violence against political opponents. Baré was assassinated in 1999, and civilian rule was restored later that year. Those elections, and subsequent ones in 2004, were widely seen as fair and positive progress towards peace and democracy in Niger.

In 2007, fighting between Tuareg groups and the government broke out once again. This conflict was caused by a number of factors, including a failure to fully implement the past peace accord. As with the previous Tuareg rebellion, fighting was sporadic, did not pose a major threat to the stability of the government, and was a transnational conflict, with part of the fighting taking place in neighboring regions of Mali. Despite the low intensity of the fighting, there were some civilian casualties, and the government instituted repressive measures on civilians and the press. Thousands of people were displaced by the conflict, which ended in 2009 with peace talks between the government and the two main rebel groups. Another coup took place in 2010 following a constitutional crisis, with civilian rule restored the next year.

Niger dealt with increased instability during the later 2010s and early 2020s. The broader Sahel region faces similar issues, most prominently a transnational jihadist insurgency and recent military coups. In 2015, Islamist groups who had previously fought the Malian government began to operate in Niger. The conflict intensified after 2017, and since 2021 there have been consistent attacks by Boko Haram and groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The conflict continued, as the Nigerien armed forces, with help from France and the United States, have failed to defeat the insurgency. Civilians and soldiers have been killed in terrorist attacks.

An attempted coup took place in 2021, followed by a successful one in 2023 that removed President Mohamed Bazoum from office. In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions and threatened military intervention. Besides the threat of war, which could pit many West African states against Niger and its neighbors, also ruled by coup regimes, insecurity has worsened within the country, as attacks by jihadist groups escalated following the coup.

By 2024 and 2025, the junta led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani has consolidated its rule, defying ECOWAS pressure to restore civilian governance. Sanctions have contributed to rising inflation and food shortages, worsening an already severe humanitarian situation. Negotiations between ECOWAS and the junta have stalled repeatedly, and in early 2025 Niger formally withdrew from ECOWAS alongside Burkina Faso and Mali, forming the “Alliance of Sahel States” — a regional bloc that pledges mutual defense and rejects Western military presence. France withdrew all its troops from Niger by the end of 2024 after being ordered to leave, and U.S. forces began withdrawing in 2025, with Niger announcing new security partnerships with Russia. Meanwhile, jihadist violence in Tillabéri, Diffa, and Tahoua regions has continued unabated, with the UN estimating over 600,000 people displaced and thousands killed since 2022.

Peace efforts:
Despite Niger’s long history of coups, there has been a consistent record of democratic transitions. The head of the junta that took power following the most recent coup indicated that the same would take place again, with a three-year transition period. Both Tuareg rebellions ended with peace agreements, with both sides choosing a negotiated peace in the face of a military stalemate. However, the failure to implement the first agreement fully led to the second outbreak of fighting, and the second peace deal has not led to lasting peace in Niger.

Currently, there are three threats to peace: the war with Islamist groups, the recent coup and subsequent seizure of power, and the potential for war with ECOWAS. Former President Mohamed Bazoum was open to the prospect of dialogue with some jihadist groups; however, the military council that replaced him has been less open to a peaceful solution. ECOWAS suspended most diplomatic initiatives after Niger’s withdrawal from the bloc, but the African Union and United Nations have called for renewed engagement and a return to constitutional order. In 2025, the junta began internal talks about a new constitution and electoral framework, though opposition leaders and civil groups were excluded.

While regional military intervention now seems unlikely, the Sahel remains deeply unstable, with overlapping insurgencies, food insecurity, and cross-border militant movements. Any sustainable peace in Niger will depend on restoring democratic governance, reviving regional cooperation, and addressing the economic and social conditions that have allowed extremism and military rule to thrive.