The shift from war to peace is never a linear or complete transition. In Syria’s case, the regime has declared victory in the war despite the Northwestern governorate of Idlib remaining under de facto Turkish control and Kurdish-dominated forces remaining strong in the Northeast. Continued violence throughout the country is aggravated by the overlapping and disastrous impacts of a collapsed economy, the COVID-19 pandemic, displacement, and low-level violence between militias and armed groups that persist throughout the country.
Despite this situation, the Syrian regime has begun to establish the foundations for a post-conflict order through two political processes and several legal changes aimed at absorbing the logic of war into the state. What makes the Syrian situation interesting is that this post-conflict order is being brought about outside the hegemonic oversight of outside powers, such as the United Nations, who tend to shape processes of peace and reconciliation in liberal terms that stress power sharing and distribution. I explore the consequences of what I call an “illiberal peace” in Syria in a recent article that examines how this post-conflict order is being brought about. The main argument I make is that a reconciliation process aimed at converting former armed fighters and integrating them into the regime’s counterinsurgency apparatus, a settlement process aimed at proving the loyalty of displaced Syrians and their clearance to return and live in the country, and legal changes aimed at removing the Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights of displaced Syrians constitute the basis of a post-conflict citizenship regime that seeks to punish Syrians who are deemed disloyal by the state.
This post-conflict citizenship regime is aimed at bifurcating Syrian society into the loyal and disloyal and ensuring that those deemed disloyal are punished through the loss of various rights. The reconciliation process began after the Syrian regime and its allies took over areas formerly under the control of armed groups. Fighters from these groups were offered two options: a safe, direct route to Idlib governorate or to “reconcile” with the state by disavowing their actions and joining the national army or a government-controlled militia. Over time, these two options were also given to civilians in the areas taken over by government-aligned forces. These areas became known as “reconciled areas”. The reconciliation process was one way to subject citizens remaining in Syria to a loyalty test. The settlement process was aimed at Syrians outside of the country or those who were displaced internally and wanted to return to their homes. This process functioned in the same way to subject Syrian citizens to a loyalty test to ensure that they did not engage in any behavior detrimental to the “homeland”. In other words, both processes sought to force Syrians to repent and declare their loyalty to the state.
Those who are not subject to the reconciliation or settlement process are nevertheless targeted by a series of laws that seek to punish “absenteeism”, which is defined as an absent citizen. This is a surrogate category for displaced Syrians. In these new laws, “absenteeism” is punishable by a series of offenses that include the confiscation of property and the loss of legal identity, effectively targeting an individual’s ability to live and work in Syria should they seek to return. Absent subjects are legally constructed as disloyal until they can prove otherwise.
While undertaken in the name of peace and reconciliation, Syria’s illiberal peace is creating the conditions for continued displacement, fear, and exclusion. The absence of any deliberative process or sustained political negotiations has allowed the state to construct a post-conflict order outside of any pressure from opposition groups or international actors. In doing so, the Syrian regime and its allies have constructed processes of reconciliation that do not serve to bring together the political community. For this reason, many Syrian exiles fear returning to the country and face constant worries associated with having to prove their loyalty. Even those who were “reconciled” or “settled” have been subject to arrest, imprisonment, torture, and sometimes death. Without protections for returning Syrians to ensure their security and safety, Syria’s post-conflict order structured around “reconciliation” and “settlement” is likely to bring neither about but instead will ensure the continuation of violence, exclusion, and displacement. For sustainable reconciliation to occur in Syria, there needs to be serious protections in place that ensure the legal and political rights of all Syrians to reside in their country and political processes that provide forums for dialogue and accountability. The absence of deliberation between and among Syrians is a necessary prerequisite for moving forward and constructing a post-conflict order in which war’s horrors can be stopped.
Samer Abboud
Samer Abboud is Associate Professor of Global Interdisciplinary Studies at Villanova University and the author of the book Syria (Polity, 2018).
