As Russia’s war against Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged military conflict with significant casualties on both sides, the prospect of peace negotiations is increasingly viewed by experts and citizens in Ukraine, Russia and Europe as the only viable solution to end the hostilities. Both Ukrainian and international media interpret Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s recent statement, “We are closer to peace than we think,” as an indication of Ukraine’s growing willingness to engage in negotiations—an option he previously rejected. However, the diversity of existing peace initiatives and the lack of consensus surrounding them, along with the unsuccessful Minsk Peace talks that preceded the full-scale war, greatly hinder the prospects for peace. Most importantly, the profound distrust between the conflicting parties creates a significant obstacle to long-term peace.
Currently, there are several peace initiatives and diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war. Suggested by President Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Peace Formula embraces ten points, ranging from broad and at least partly depoliticized themes, such as nuclear safety, energy and food security, to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine’s territory and the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity. On 15-16 June 2024, Switzerland hosted the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, where over seventy countries and five international organizations supported this Peace Formula. Though attending the summit, several important Global South countries, such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, refrained from endorsing the final declaration, and China did not attend the summit.
At the same time, China and Brazil are pushing for their own six-point plan to stop the war. This plan does not offer a specific solution to the conflict but rather paves the way to negotiations. It argues for de-escalation, emphasizes political settlement, as well as warns against the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. The plan also contains (a rather vague) point, saying that “dividing the world into insulated political or economic groupings should be opposed”. Subsequently, Brazil and China call for enhancing international cooperation in multiple domains, including energy, trade and finance. Though the China-Brazil Plan partly intersects with the Ukraine Formula (e.g. in part related to nuclear safety), it was criticized by Zelenskyy, calling it a ‘half-hearted settlement plan’, due to the absent focus on restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Switzerland recently became the first European country to support the China-Brazil plan, alongside its support for Zelenskyy’s initiative.
Russia’s response to these peace efforts leaves little hope for a quick start of official negotiations. Russia rejected the Ukraine’s Peace Formula, alongside the invitation to the next Peace Summit. Instead, President Putin stated that the Kremlin would be willing to end the war if Ukraine cedes the entirety of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions—of which only Luhansk is fully under Russian control—and abandons its plans to join NATO. The Kremlin has so far not reacted to the China-Brazil Plan, although it has indicated its overall readiness to negotiate with Ukraine.
The lack of trust between the conflicting parties over long-term peace is also based on a decade of failed negotiations before the 2022 full-scale invasion. This was manifested in the Minsk Peace Process between 2014 and 2022 that aimed to resolve the Donbas conflict. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements froze the Donbas war, but didn’t resolve it. The experience of frozen conflict, negotiations deadlock, and lasting Russian control of parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions make Ukrainian leadership extremely cautious that negotiations won’t lead to a resolution, but rather only to a ceasefire and/or freezing the contact line. Based on this past experience, the main fear for Ukraine is that any settlement now would only be used by the Kremlin as a break in military actions to rearm and prepare for the next attack. For Russian leadership, the Minsk Peace Process can be also seen as a failure of their coercive diplomacy strategy. This partly explains their eagerness to obtain territorial concessions from Ukraine early on, rather than engage into another decade of negotiations which in their view would be fruitless.
The decade-long conflict, which escalated into the largest war in Europe since World War II, has thus resulted in significant mutual animosity and a drastic decline in trust between the parties involved. The experience with the Minsk Peace Process has further entrenched these divisions, making resolution increasingly challenging. Unless the parties have the genuine will to negotiate and – independently or through a mediator – agree on and abide by minimum pre-negotiations and confidence-building steps, the proliferation of a peace initiative will not lead to peace.
Maryna Rabinovych
Maryna Rabinovych works as a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the UiT the Arctic University of Norway as a Post-Doctoral Researcher, focusing on the consequences of the Russia’s war against Ukraine for municipalities in Arctic Norway. Her previous post-doctoral project, titled “Lowering the bar? – Compliance Negotiations and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, was funded by the Research Council of Norway and implemented at the University of Agder. She holds a PhD (magna cum laude) in Legal Studies from the University of Hamburg, an LL.M “European and European Legal Studies” from the University of Hamburg and Eropa-Kolleg Hamburg, as well as an LL.B from Odesa National University.
