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School Textbooks: Teaching Conflict and (to a Lesser Extent) Peace

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Over the past year, the world has watched several high-profile conflicts with horror. These include the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, and growing animosity over racial, ethnic, and political divisions in many countries, perhaps most strikingly in the United States. While textbooks are meant to educate the next generation, our research finds that they also perpetuate the divisions in society that feed conflict. On some occasions, they also promote peace. 

We interpret conflict broadly to include armed conflict as well as social and structural inequalities and divisions. In addition to the case studies we have conducted on primary school textbooks in Sri Lanka, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, we collected case studies from other authors on the use of textbooks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Jordan, and Pakistan, and on secondary school textbooks in South Sudan and Afghanistan. Across these diverse contexts, a central theme is that textbooks most often serve as an accomplice to conflict through the perpetuation of discriminatory stereotypes, historical divisions, and power discrepancies between groups of people. For example, in Sri Lankan textbooks, despite references to the importance of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity, there is a consistent privileging of the dominant Sinhala culture. By disproportionately featuring examples of Sinhala language and culture and the Buddhist religion—and at times completely excluding examples from minoritized cultures or identities—the textbooks suggest a Sri Lankan national identity as Sinhala-Buddhist. An even more stark example is found in Maja Halilovic-Pastuovic’s research on textbooks within Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Two Schools Under One Roof policy. In this case, students of different ethnicities within the same school are separated into different classes with different curricula reflecting their ethnic identities. For example, students of Croat background in Bosnia-Herzegovina are taught using textbooks from Croatia that exclusively describe the geography of Croatia with no reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite this tendency to reinforce conflict within the pages of a textbook, each of our case studies also identifies ways in which school textbooks are contributing to peace, social justice, and inclusion, although usually in smaller and more subtle ways. A prominent example is evident in Emily Dunlop’s analysis of textbooks from Burundi, which actively address clauses from the country’s peace agreement, including sections that are devoted to “Education for Peace” and require students to analyze factors that promote peace. Provoking students to critically analyze factors that promote peace and justice like this is, unfortunately, rare. More often, transformative moments in textbooks appear in the form of intentional representation of women in non-traditional roles or the acknowledgment of the importance of peace and equality and the negative effects of war. Textbooks can deepen these transformative moments by provoking critical reflection on what they represent, as in the case identified from Burundi. 

The victimized role of textbooks appears most clearly when conflict prevents students from accessing textbooks. In South Sudan, education spending for many years has been curtailed while funds from social services are diverted to military spending. This has led to low levels of accessibility and distribution of textbooks resulting in high pupil-textbook ratios at primary school levels and, as Merethe Skårås’ research identifies, no accessibility to secondary school textbooks until very recently. 

Our work calls on educational stakeholders at all levels to recognize the politicized nature of textbooks. We call for cautious attention to the content of textbooks and the need to work with diverse representatives from multiple sides of a conflict—particularly historically marginalized groups—to ensure that the textbooks that reach classrooms are ultimately going to do more to promote peace and equality than a resurgence of conflict.

This blog post describes research from a 2022 book entitled Teaching Peace and Conflict: The Multiple Roles of Textbooks in Peacebuilding, available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-04676-6 

DRC: Changing the Story of Sexual Violence

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At the height of the DRC’s conflict a report found that an average of 48 women were raped every hour. Find out how the country is beginning to recover from patterns of sexual violence.

Give Unbiased Mediation a Chance

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Ukraine Mediation Peace News.

Without external mediation between Ukraine and Russia, achieving peace in Eastern Europe will be a difficult undertaking. It is high time for policymakers to start thinking seriously about how and when the two sides can be brought to the negotiation table to prevent the further loss of human lives, war crimes, and meaningless destruction. The free and democratic Ukraine defending itself against a foreign invader should decide when and whether to accept third-party mediators. However, reviving peace talks at this stage of the conflict may be easier said than done. 

First, research suggests that mediation has a higher chance of success during the initial three months of conflict. Russia’s invasion began nearly five months ago, so peacebuilding has become increasingly more difficult. Also, mediation is more effective (64%) in cases where no significant cultural minority is present. This is relevant because Russia ties the conflict and its resolution to the treatment and status of the Russian speakers in Ukraine. Regional security is another dimension of the conflict. Another insight from the literature indicates that security-related conflicts are more difficult to mediate than disputes, for instance, over resources. Furthermore, mediation has a better chance of working when the power disparities between opponents and the fatality rates are not significant. Regrettably, all these findings indicate that the chances of restoring peace in the region via successful mediation will decrease over time. 

Indeed, a chance for peace emerged early in the war. After Moscow failed to take over Kyiv and before the atrocities in Bucha became known, both parties accepted third-party mediation. As Belarus abetted the invasion, it could not serve as a neutral venue for negotiations anymore. China, Israel, and Turkey each offered to act as intermediaries. Kyiv and Moscow perceived Turkey as a sufficiently equidistant actor and participated in peace talks in Istanbul. Russia won significant concessions while Kyiv agreed to declare its permanent neutrality, downsize its military budget, avoid hosting foreign bases and abstain from participation in NATO exercises. The two sides were also negotiating provisions concerning the Russian speakers of Ukraine and the status of Crimea and Donbas. In return for its neutrality, Ukraine hoped to obtain the withdrawal of the Russian troops and hard security guarantees, whereby major powers would protect the country from other Russian attacks in the future. Regrettably, however, talks broke down after outrage over Bucha. After Russia’s failed attack on Kyiv, its forces began a new phase of the invasion concentrated in Donbas. Russia also occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, two regions in southeastern Ukraine.  

Second, broader geopolitical rivalries undermined peace. The failed mediation efforts in Donbas prior to 2022 point to the complexity of the issue. The Normandy format, the pre-2022 mediation process including France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, became extremely polarized as the West backed Kyiv and Russia supported the rebels. As neither side was willing to make significant concessions, negotiations stalled.

Tied to polarization is the problem of structural bias. Specifically, for eight years, Russia acted as a party to the Donbas conflict, a patron-state for the breakaway regions, a mediator, and as a former imperial power seeking to shape the domestic politics of Ukraine. As Ukraine’s relations with the EU intensified, the patron-client ties between Russia and Donbas deepened over the eight years preceding the invasion so that the unrecognized republics became structurally dependent on Moscow. Examples include vital subsidies for the Donbas industry, Russian citizenship for residents, educational programs aligned with the ones in Russia and so on. Moscow’s official recognition of the breakaway regions in 2022 further revealed that it opposed their reintegration into Ukraine. While biased mediators may be effective in bringing about peace elsewhere, in Donbas, mediator bias had a negative impact on peacebuilding.

Third, even if the legacy of failed mediation can be forgotten, there is a more serious obstacle to peace. The timing of mediation attempts matters. A conflict must be ripe before the disputants can engage in peace negotiations. In other words, as long as both parties believe that they can make gains on the battlefield, mediation is unlikely to work. This involves reaching a stalemate in which both sides are locked without the prospect of achieving a decisive victory. 

Fourth, restoring peace is difficult due to various destructive psychological processes caused by the ongoing violence and continuous Russian shelling of Ukraine. Revenge and hostile images of each other fuel new cycles of violence. That is why achieving stable long-term peace between Russia and Ukraine requires more than just a ceasefire. It necessitates conflict transformation through dialogue. However, amidst an illegal war of aggression, various calls for Ukrainians to engage in negotiations with the invading power seem morally unjustifiable. 

That is why the next best thing that policymakers interested in bringing about peace could do is to help Kyiv defend itself and call on Russia to deoccupy Ukraine, while offering their mediation services in order to reestablish consultations between Moscow and Kyiv. The successful Ukrainian-Russian talks concerning the exports of grain via the Black Sea ports are a positive step in the right direction as the renewed dialogue helped avert a regional food crisis

A Critical Juncture in Myanmar – Opportunities for Reconciliation?

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Following the military coup of 1 February 2021, Myanmar is in turmoil. At this critical juncture, it is worth re-visiting and re-imagining the type of country Burma could be.

Myanmar’s complex conflict context

Within days of the military takeover, huge numbers of ordinary people took to the streets, launching a Civil Disobedience Movement which continues to this day. Following violent crackdowns against the protesters, tens of thousands of young people took up calls for resistance. As of July 2022, more than 2,000 anti-coup activists have been killed by the Army in addition to untold numbers of ethnic nationality civilians caught up in the grinding civil war. Following the junta’s bloody crackdown, opposition to the coup proliferated. In almost every one of Myanmar’s 320 townships, People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) emerged. These are diverse in character, with some aligned to the National Unity Government (established by elected lawmakers and other opposition actors, after the coup), some working with already long-established Ethnic Armed Organisations (sometimes also known as Ethnic Resistance Organisations or EAOs), and others operating independently.  

Eighteen months after the coup, every day brings news of further attacks and the death or defection of more Myanmar Army soldiers. Despite some predictions that PDFs would quickly be defeated, the opposite seems to be happening. In many parts of the country (including Sagaing and Magwe Regions, which have seen no armed conflict for decades), the PDFs have inflicted significant battlefield casualties on the Myanmar Army.

In several ethnic states, PDFs have made common cause with EAOs. Particularly in Chin, Kachin, Karenni and Karen areas, EAOs and PDFs have resisted violent incursions by the Myanmar Army, in some cases pushing them back. This is happening in a context where EAOs such as the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Organisation have been providing essential services to conflict-affected, ethnic nationality communities for decades. Other new actors include several sub-national (state-level) governance bodies, which have emerged in several areas since the coup, bringing together civil society networks, political parties and EAOs.

‘Federalism from below’

While constitutional change is necessary for just and sustainable conflict resolution, federalism can also be seen as an asymmetrical ‘emergent phenomenon’ – developing from the ‘bottom-up’, out of the existing, autonomous practices and arrangement of communities and EAOs. The international diplomatic and aid community should support these local governance administrations and service delivery systems – particularly given the illegitimacy of the military regime. Education and other services provided by EAOs, often in partnership with CSOs, can be considered the building blocks of a new type of federalism in Myanmar. 

Federalism has long been considered an important tool for resolving Myanmar’s protracted state-society and centre-periphery conflicts and achieving self-determination for ethnic nationality communities. While constitutional change is necessary for just and sustainable conflict resolution, federalism can also be seen as an ‘emergent phenomenon’ – developing from the ‘bottom-up’ out of the existing practices and existing arrangement of communities and EAOs.

The emergence of federalism-from-below in Myanmar is an asymmetrical phenomenon, based on deep-rooted political cultures among long-established ethnic nationality stakeholders and societies, which have played out differently in different parts of the country. In order for federal political arrangements to meet the historic demands of ethnic-national communities, it is important that minority representatives (and ‘minorities-within-minorities’) are included in decision-making and power-holding forums at the sub-state level. Although EAOs enjoy significant legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent, their political credibility needs to be demonstrated to domestic and international stakeholders through responsible and rights-based approaches.

The mother of all ‘critical junctures’

It seems unlikely that the majority of Myanmar’s citizens will be reconciled anytime soon with the military regime holding power. Instead, the challenge and opportunity is for reconciliation between the Burman majority and ethnic nationality citizens, who for decades have suffered such violence.

Before the coup, political reform and the peace process were stalled under an NLD government that failed to deliver on its promises to ethnic nationality communities. Since the military takeover, however, the country’s politics have been re-energized. ‘Gen Z’ and other young people from the cities are making common cause with Myanmar’s ethnic nationality actors who themselves have suffered from decades of state-led violence and forced assimilation.

Myanmar is at a critical juncture, in which narratives, identities and interests are being displaced and reworked. This is an extraordinary opportunity for building common ground between opponents of a military regime, ethnic Burman people from the cities, and activists and communities from ethnic areas.

It is essential that the international community does not jeopardize the struggle for freedom, and movements toward national reconciliation in Myanmar by recognizing sham elections, which the military junta currently plans to hold next year. Without full, free and fair participation from all political stakeholders, any elections or moves towards a negotiated settlement to decades of state-society and armed conflict will lack credibility and exacerbate conflict.

Can South Sudan Maintain Its Fragile Peace?

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South Sudan is now facing the most extreme levels of food insecurity since independence in 2011. The World Food Programme has declared that 75% of South Sudan’s population is facing severe famine.