Without external mediation between Ukraine and Russia, achieving peace in Eastern Europe will be a difficult undertaking. It is high time for policymakers to start thinking seriously about how and when the two sides can be brought to the negotiation table to prevent the further loss of human lives, war crimes, and meaningless destruction. The free and democratic Ukraine defending itself against a foreign invader should decide when and whether to accept third-party mediators. However, reviving peace talks at this stage of the conflict may be easier said than done.
First, research suggests that mediation has a higher chance of success during the initial three months of conflict. Russia’s invasion began nearly five months ago, so peacebuilding has become increasingly more difficult. Also, mediation is more effective (64%) in cases where no significant cultural minority is present. This is relevant because Russia ties the conflict and its resolution to the treatment and status of the Russian speakers in Ukraine. Regional security is another dimension of the conflict. Another insight from the literature indicates that security-related conflicts are more difficult to mediate than disputes, for instance, over resources. Furthermore, mediation has a better chance of working when the power disparities between opponents and the fatality rates are not significant. Regrettably, all these findings indicate that the chances of restoring peace in the region via successful mediation will decrease over time.
Indeed, a chance for peace emerged early in the war. After Moscow failed to take over Kyiv and before the atrocities in Bucha became known, both parties accepted third-party mediation. As Belarus abetted the invasion, it could not serve as a neutral venue for negotiations anymore. China, Israel, and Turkey each offered to act as intermediaries. Kyiv and Moscow perceived Turkey as a sufficiently equidistant actor and participated in peace talks in Istanbul. Russia won significant concessions while Kyiv agreed to declare its permanent neutrality, downsize its military budget, avoid hosting foreign bases and abstain from participation in NATO exercises. The two sides were also negotiating provisions concerning the Russian speakers of Ukraine and the status of Crimea and Donbas. In return for its neutrality, Ukraine hoped to obtain the withdrawal of the Russian troops and hard security guarantees, whereby major powers would protect the country from other Russian attacks in the future. Regrettably, however, talks broke down after outrage over Bucha. After Russia’s failed attack on Kyiv, its forces began a new phase of the invasion concentrated in Donbas. Russia also occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, two regions in southeastern Ukraine.
Second, broader geopolitical rivalries undermined peace. The failed mediation efforts in Donbas prior to 2022 point to the complexity of the issue. The Normandy format, the pre-2022 mediation process including France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, became extremely polarized as the West backed Kyiv and Russia supported the rebels. As neither side was willing to make significant concessions, negotiations stalled.
Tied to polarization is the problem of structural bias. Specifically, for eight years, Russia acted as a party to the Donbas conflict, a patron-state for the breakaway regions, a mediator, and as a former imperial power seeking to shape the domestic politics of Ukraine. As Ukraine’s relations with the EU intensified, the patron-client ties between Russia and Donbas deepened over the eight years preceding the invasion so that the unrecognized republics became structurally dependent on Moscow. Examples include vital subsidies for the Donbas industry, Russian citizenship for residents, educational programs aligned with the ones in Russia and so on. Moscow’s official recognition of the breakaway regions in 2022 further revealed that it opposed their reintegration into Ukraine. While biased mediators may be effective in bringing about peace elsewhere, in Donbas, mediator bias had a negative impact on peacebuilding.
Third, even if the legacy of failed mediation can be forgotten, there is a more serious obstacle to peace. The timing of mediation attempts matters. A conflict must be ripe before the disputants can engage in peace negotiations. In other words, as long as both parties believe that they can make gains on the battlefield, mediation is unlikely to work. This involves reaching a stalemate in which both sides are locked without the prospect of achieving a decisive victory.
Fourth, restoring peace is difficult due to various destructive psychological processes caused by the ongoing violence and continuous Russian shelling of Ukraine. Revenge and hostile images of each other fuel new cycles of violence. That is why achieving stable long-term peace between Russia and Ukraine requires more than just a ceasefire. It necessitates conflict transformation through dialogue. However, amidst an illegal war of aggression, various calls for Ukrainians to engage in negotiations with the invading power seem morally unjustifiable.
That is why the next best thing that policymakers interested in bringing about peace could do is to help Kyiv defend itself and call on Russia to deoccupy Ukraine, while offering their mediation services in order to reestablish consultations between Moscow and Kyiv. The successful Ukrainian-Russian talks concerning the exports of grain via the Black Sea ports are a positive step in the right direction as the renewed dialogue helped avert a regional food crisis.
Ion Marandici
Ion Marandici, Ph.D. (Rutgers U. 2017) studies the political economy of reforms across Eastern Europe and East Asia, Russian foreign policy, conflict processes across Eurasia and nationalism. His publications include articles in Nationalities Papers, Problems of Post-Communism, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Demokratizatsiya, Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies as well as chapters in collaborative volumes. Ion was the recipient of a doctoral fellowship from the Open Society Institute in New York. At Rutgers, he has been regularly teaching courses in comparative politics, international relations, research methods, and legal philosophy. In 2016, Ion was a visiting researcher at the Graduate Institute of National Development (National Taiwan University in Taipei). In 2022, he worked as a consultant on open data reforms in Central Asia as well as on anti-corruption policies in Eastern Europe for the World Bank. Ion knows several foreign languages.
