Disasters are frequently associated with higher risks for armed conflict and political instability. Both scholars and policy makers have linked droughts to the civil war onsets in Sudan and Syria as well as cyclones with the recruitment of combatants in the Philippines. Debates about climate security often also conceive such disasters as threat multipliers that increase armed conflict risks. With the number and intensity of disasters on the rise due to climate change, urbanisation and persistent poverty, will this result in a more insecure world?
This is possible, but not necessarily the case. When a massive tsunami in the Indian Ocean hit the civil-war ravaged province Aceh in Indonesia, hostilities quickly declined. The disaster provided a moral high ground to politicians on both sides to engage in negotiations. It also increased public and international pressure to stop the conflict in an area suffering from both fighting and the tsunami. Less than a year after the tsunami, a peace agreement ended the civil war for good.
How generalisable are such patterns beyond the specific case of Aceh? My recent book addresses this question by analysing 36 cases of large-scale disasters striking armed conflict zones. The answer is pretty straightforward: While conflict dynamics sometimes do not change or fighting even escalates, disasters have caused a significant reduction of fighting intensity in 25% of all cases. Such de-escalations usually persist for six to twelve months and provide an opportunity to seek diplomatic solutions while peace spoilers are less active. After all, research has shown that reduced battlefield violence increases trust, reduces bitterness, and provides more fertile ground for mediation efforts.
In order to utilise such post-disaster opportunities, decision makers need to know when and how do disasters facilitate a reduction in armed conflict intensity. My study answers both of these questions.
To start with, armed conflicts usually de-escalate when the disaster provides relevant constraints to the conflict parties. The 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, for instance, killed many fighters and destroyed camps of the Lahkar-e-Toiba (LeT) insurgents. The group also felt obliged to conduct relief operations for the local population in both India and Pakistan. Taken together, this reduced LeT’s capability to wage violence against the Indian military. The latter could not exploit the weakness of its opponent as it was busy with disaster relief and infrastructure reconstruction itself. More recently, the heavy 2022 floods were one of the factors causing the Boko Haram extremists to withdraw from contested areas in north-eastern Nigeria.
Less frequently, conflict parties also reduce their use of force to cultivate a positive image among internal or external audiences. Once Myanmar allowed some international assistance to enter the country after cyclone Nargis in 2008 and was in the spotlight of the global public, the regime’s forces temporarily constrained their violent activities. Likewise, the 1999 Marmara earthquake provided the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels with an opportunity to save their face and label their ceasefire as a humanitarian gesture (even though they declared it due to other reasons).
So, contrary to earlier theories about post-disaster solidarity and diplomacy, disasters rather facilitate a short-term, negative peace: a reduction in conflict intensity due to disaster-related constraints. However, as discussed above, such as situation can still provide windows of opportunity for humanitarian aid delivery and mediation efforts. Such windows are most likely to occur if one conflict party is weakened by the disaster (for instance because it had lost fighters or resources or needs to deal with increased public scrutiny) and the other conflict party cannot exploit this weakness (for instance because it is generally weak or busy with the disaster response itself).
Disasters cause immense human suffering and economic disruption, and decision makers should therefore engage in comprehensive disaster risk reduction efforts. However, with current trends persisting, the world will not see a reduction in disaster frequency or intensity in the near future. Consequentially, it is crucial to recognise and utilise the opportunities such disasters can provide for peacebuilding and aid delivery.
Featured image: Disaster (Wikimedia)
Tobias Ide
Tobias Ide is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Murdoch University Perth (Australia) and Specially Appointed Professor for Peace and Sustainability at Hiroshima University (Japan). He received most of his academic training Germany and published widely on the environment, climate, peace and conflict, including in International Security, Journal of Peace Research, and Nature Climate Change. Tobias also frequently works with and consults decision makers, including at the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO.
