Can communities forgive former al-Shabaab members in Somalia? How is reintegration different for women than men? What is the Somali government doing to reintegrate and rehabilitate former al-Shabaab members?
When she was 20, a young woman known as Khadija was recruited into al-Shabaab and eventually put in charge of dozens of other women in the group. Years later, she escaped by selling her gun outside the camp and using the money to get home. The reception she received from her own family was cold, and she has struggled ever since to find work and rebuild her life. Her story, recorded by researchers at the Institute for Security Studies, is far from unique. Although Khadija is from Kenya, her story is similar to those of many Somalis who joined al-Shabaab. Somalia’s long-running conflict with al-Shabaab has pushed thousands of people, including children, into the group’s ranks. Many later try to leave. What happens to them next often depends less on formal government policy than on whether their communities are willing to accept them back.
A new study offers some of the clearest evidence yet on what shapes that willingness, at a time when the conflict in Somalia is still active.
A program built for women and children
Since 2012, Somalia’s Defector Rehabilitation Programme (DRP) has offered people leaving al-Shabaab a path back into civilian life, including dedicated centers for women and children. An estimated 3,000 people—including roughly 600 women—have participated in the program. According to the International Peace Institute, many more try to return to their communities informally, without government support.
Researchers Dr. Blair Welsh of the University of Western Ontario and Dr. Prabin Khadka, of the University of Essex, set out to understand whether ordinary citizens are actually willing to accept these defectors back into their neighborhoods. The researchers reached 880 people across 81 communities in seven cities, including Baidoa, Kismayo, and Jowhaar. Respondents were asked, in different versions of the same scenario, whether they thought their community should accept a former al-Shabaab member home, with the defector’s age and gender varied at random. The study is published in International Studies Quarterly and a shorter summary appears as a May 2026 policy brief with the Governance and Local Development Institute.
What ordinary citizens told researchers
The headline finding cuts against a common assumption. Many observers might expect communities to be harsher toward women who joined a violent group, since doing so breaks with the gendered expectations placed on them. Instead, the opposite was found. Female defectors were somewhat more likely to be accepted than male ones, and children were more likely to be accepted than adults.
Overall, 76 percent of respondents said they were willing to welcome defectors into their community, and 68 percent said they were willing to forgive former members for their time with al-Shabaab. But that openness was far from uniform. In Jowhaar, 95 percent of respondents supported acceptance. In Baidoa, where exposure to al-Shabaab violence has been higher, the figure dropped to 58 percent. People whose immediate family had been killed by al-Shabaab were measurably less willing to accept defectors, a reminder that reconciliation has to compete with real grief and fear.
Two other factors mattered a great deal to the people surveyed. Defectors who had served in non-fighting roles, such as cooking or logistics, or who had been forcibly recruited rather than joining voluntarily, were significantly more likely to be welcomed. Among women, those who had been married to al-Shabaab fighters, whether by choice or by force, were much more likely to be accepted, by 53 to 59 percentage points, compared to unmarried women. The researchers suggest this reflects existing social roles available to women as wives and mothers, which communities can recognize and accept even when the woman’s broader history is more complicated.
Where it falls short
The study also points to real limits in the current system. Vocational training, which the researchers found to be an important factor in communities accepting female defectors, is currently only available in a small capacity. Financial support from government and non-government organizations for children completing the program, found to matter a great deal for their acceptance, is applied inconsistently across rehabilitation sites. Outreach in high-conflict areas like Baidoa, where acceptance is lowest, has not kept pace with need.
What this means for communities
The clearest practical lesson from the research is that acceptance is not simply a matter of time or willpower. Rather, it responds to specific, fixable conditions. Communities that already have some experience hosting defectors are substantially more open to accepting others, suggesting that structured introductions, through local elders or community meetings, could help build trust in areas with no prior exposure.
For families like Khadija’s, none of this guarantees an easier homecoming. But the findings suggest that how a community is prepared and what it is told about a defector’s background and circumstances can shape whether that homecoming succeeds. In a conflict that remains unresolved, the success of reintegration may depend as much on local acts of acceptance and trust-building as on policies crafted in the capital.
Keywords: Somalia, al-Shabaab, extremism, terrorism, peace, conflict, conflict resolution, reintegration
Blair Welsh
Dr Blair Welsh is a Wolfe-Western Fellow and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario. His research investigates the politics of armed violence and development across three major themes: (1) causes and consequences of armed violence; (2) conflict and displacement; and (3) post-conflict recovery.
Prabin Khadka
Dr Prabin Khadka is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex. He researches how international interventions shape social cohesion and conflict dynamics. His research builds on practical experience in conflict-affected settings, focusing on how peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, and countering violent extremism intersect with economic and political dynamics.
